Will India Do Better Or Worse Under ‘Centrists’ Biden & Harris?

[00:00:00] Rise Above The Din Unbox the News with me, Raghav Behal

[00:00:20] The Democratic National Convention, DNC nominated Joe Biden and Kamala Harris for the November

[00:00:26] elections in a uniquely spectacular manner.

[00:00:30] The fact that it was a COVID-induced virtual event was perhaps the least of it.

[00:00:36] But you know the parade of Republican heavyweights at a democratic convention was unprecedented

[00:00:41] from Colin Powell, John Kasich to Cindy McKinnon.

[00:00:46] I started to think what legal convolutions would have gotten triggered if India's Mothriddon

[00:00:51] anti-defection law was applied to these worthies.

[00:00:55] Be that as it may, this unusual pivot to the politics of a centrist consensus and

[00:01:02] reconciliation has given Biden-Harris a real shot at defeating the incumbent Trump-Pence

[00:01:08] duo.

[00:01:10] Once thought to be outside the realm of possibility, it could be happening now, thereby begging

[00:01:16] the question, will India do better or worse under centrist Biden and Harris?

[00:01:22] How will the India-U.S. relationship pan out from here on?

[00:01:28] For India, as for much of the world, the 2016 election of Donald Trump as President of the

[00:01:34] United States proved disruptive and disorienting.

[00:01:38] In short order, he cancelled the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrew the U.S. from the

[00:01:43] Paris Climate Accord, blasted America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO allies

[00:01:49] while sucking up two adversaries such as North Korea and Russia.

[00:01:53] He ridiculed global bodies from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, launched

[00:01:59] a trade war with China and pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal reimposing sanctions lifted

[00:02:06] by the Obama administration.

[00:02:09] His push to put America first reduced U.S. engagement in Asia as everywhere, upending

[00:02:16] the old Western world order and leaving a power vacuum which was custom made for China

[00:02:23] to fill.

[00:02:25] Trump retreated even more menacingly into his polarizing shell as his monumental failure

[00:02:31] in handling the COVID-19 pandemic exposed him to anger, ridicule and perhaps an imminent

[00:02:39] defeat come November.

[00:02:41] Unlike President Bush and Obama, Trump has been unabashedly transactional with India.

[00:02:50] Plunging into a divisive trade war, the U.S. President singled out India for unfair practices,

[00:02:56] threatening to cut off bilateral trade altogether over India's high tariffs on Harley-Davidson

[00:03:02] motorcycles.

[00:03:03] And Washington's 2018 imposition of sanctions on countries that buy oil from Iran was especially

[00:03:10] painful for India, even with a temporary waiver given that Iran is one of our biggest suppliers.

[00:03:17] At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and lethal China-India border clashes, he twisted

[00:03:24] the knife to extract hydroxychloroquine supplies, shafted H1B visa holders and short-circuited

[00:03:32] foreign students' education in America, all of which hit India very hard where

[00:03:37] it hurts.

[00:03:39] But in the long history of U.S.-India relations, the Trump presidency is just a hiccup.

[00:03:45] After all, events of the 21st century have drawn U.S. and Indian interests into closer

[00:03:50] natural alignment, underscoring both the strategic challenges we share – Islamic extremism,

[00:03:58] Chinese dominance, instability in the Middle East and the advantages of enhanced security

[00:04:03] and trade ties.

[00:04:05] We simply need each other.

[00:04:09] The oldest democracy and the largest have more in common than perhaps either would care

[00:04:15] to admit.

[00:04:16] Born of British colonialism 200 years apart, both India and the U.S. feature diverse,

[00:04:23] sometimes unwieldy populations that nonetheless maintain faith in free market enterprise,

[00:04:29] a basic trust in free and fair elections, and the expectation of government transparency.

[00:04:35] And both India and the U.S. are blessed with youthful, energetic populations, promising

[00:04:40] a steady stream of workers for decades to come.

[00:04:43] And that's in contrast to the rapidly aging workforces of China, Japan and the

[00:04:48] European Union.

[00:04:50] Most importantly, they share the same basic worldview centered on advancing democracy,

[00:04:56] stopping Islamic terrorism, regulating China, and ensuring the free movement of goods,

[00:05:02] people, and ideas throughout the global common.

[00:05:06] Their economies share structural strengths, including robust consumer spending, strong

[00:05:11] exports, a shrinking deficit, an entrepreneurial private sector, and technological prowess.

[00:05:16] That has helped them withstand not only the 2008 global financial meltdown, but also

[00:05:23] more recent geopolitical bombshells such as Brexit, China's slowdown, the Syrian

[00:05:28] refugee crisis, and widespread Russian hacking.

[00:05:32] The jury, of course, is out on how both will recover from the post-COVID economic shock.

[00:05:40] In many ways, our economic and strategic bonds with the U.S. are deeper than ever.

[00:05:47] The U.S. has become India's largest partner with bilateral trade near $100 billion every

[00:05:53] year.

[00:05:55] More than 600 American companies, and this includes Microsoft, Google, Uber, Walmart,

[00:06:00] and Amazon operate in India.

[00:06:02] Apple is actively planning to manufacture its latest iPhones here.

[00:06:07] U.S. investments in the country have jumped many-fold.

[00:06:12] Our strategic relationship too has broken new ground as we join forces in unprecedented

[00:06:17] ways and places to stabilize a precarious world.

[00:06:21] Of course, we can go much further still.

[00:06:24] The truth is that the U.S., especially under a centrist Biden-Harris administration, would

[00:06:29] prefer to embrace India, but perhaps without the bombast.

[00:06:34] But in much more subtle ways, India is the world's second most populous country, expected

[00:06:40] to overtake first place China by 2022.

[00:06:44] It also has the third biggest economy measured at purchasing power parity and the fourth

[00:06:49] strongest military.

[00:06:50] By 2050, China will be the world's largest economy with a nominal GDP of $106 trillion.

[00:06:58] That's nearly about $62 trillion at PPP.

[00:07:02] Its share of global GDP is expected to peak at 20% around 2030 and then, of course, it

[00:07:09] will slowly begin to shrink.

[00:07:11] At the same time, the U.S. in India will rank as the second and third biggest economies

[00:07:16] respectively measured at PPP.

[00:07:18] India's GDP is expected to be slightly higher than America's by 2050, pushing it into second

[00:07:24] place.

[00:07:25] Of course, we are assuming a reasonably quick reversion to the meme once COVID-19 is tamed.

[00:07:31] And India's share of global GDP could nearly double by 2050 from 7% at PPP in 2014 to

[00:07:39] 13.5%.

[00:07:40] And that's roughly the same as America's.

[00:07:43] Japan expected to fall from third to seventh place in GDP rankings by mid-century and the

[00:07:50] three democratic powers will account for roughly 35% of global GDP, making them the

[00:07:56] strongest economic bloc in the world.

[00:07:59] That will guarantee the global primacy of their strategic and diplomatic agendas.

[00:08:05] Like Britain and Japan, India shares with the U.S. a commitment to democracy and

[00:08:10] all its freedoms, both civic and economic.

[00:08:13] While this may not have mattered much to a transactional Trump, a Biden-Harris administration will have

[00:08:21] to visibly respect our political dispensation.

[00:08:26] Diplomatic impasses such as the one over Iran will allow us to test the relationship's

[00:08:32] resilience, perhaps finding new compromises or at least learning to respect one another's

[00:08:39] sovereign interests.