A Former Ambassador Reveals What Happens Inside India's Toughest Global Negotiations | Mohan Kumar

[00:00:00] In some areas, I believe India is extremely well positioned to shape the rules of the road and become a Vishwa Guru. This is a time for India to bite the bullet. We cannot postpone the difficult reforms anymore. There is no other option.

[00:00:19] The power differential between China and India is so big that we cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with China. In all the 40 years that I have dealt with international relations and geopolitics, this is the first time I'm seeing... Sir, thank you so much for making the time. Really appreciate you being on Bharatvaarta.

[00:00:48] Thank you very much for having me, Roshan Cariappa, on Bharatvaarta. A great pleasure to be on your show. Sir, for most of our lives, we grew up in a world where it was going to get increasingly globalized. We were all going to get connected. Trade would increase, war would reduce and so on. But over the last five years, we have witnessed something different. The world feels very fragmented today.

[00:01:10] It's even unstable and dangerous, one might say. Are we witnessing the collapse of the post-Cold War rule-based world order that we had? I think that's a very interesting question to start our conversation today. I think there are two parts to your question. One is on the world order as it was established in the aftermath of the World War II. The other is the question on globalization. So let me address those two issues if you like.

[00:01:39] They are linked, but I would like to treat them somewhat separately, if you like. The first on the world order, there is absolutely no question that the order that was established in the aftermath of the World War II, often termed as liberal international order for all its flaws. And there are people who say it was neither liberal nor was it international and nor was it an order.

[00:02:06] You can say what you want, but it held its own during a long period of time. So there is absolute consensus among geopolitical analysts that that liberal international order has certainly ended. There is no doubt about that. Whether you take the political dimension, the economic or the social dimension of it,

[00:02:30] the world is not clear. And so we are in a period of interregnum when we move from one order to the other. And when we do so, those periods are very, very delicate Roshan Cariappa. They either lead to a lot of chaos and worse, sometimes conflict.

[00:02:57] And we are seeing at least two big conflicts. I mean, I'm not counting the other conflicts, but at least you've got Ukraine, which is still unresolved. And you've got the conflict in Iran and the Middle East, which is unresolved. So definitely an interregnum between two world orders where countries and powers, I think, are jostling for influence.

[00:03:21] We saw the latest summit meeting between U.S. and China, but I can point to several other meetings that have happened where I think countries are trying to build loose alliances among themselves and trying to create the rules of the road. And that has not happened, but we are in a period of interregnum. As for your question on globalization, I think it would be wrong to say that there is a collapse of globalization.

[00:03:51] But what has happened, I think, is definitely globalization as we understood it in terms of a free movement of ideas, capital, people and so on. That has also come to an end. That is unbridled, unregulated, unrestricted movement of people, ideas and capital.

[00:04:16] That has come to an end. So there is an attempt to refashion globalization. Some aspects of globalization will never go away. For example, social media. The fact that we are all interconnected, internet and AI is going to only accelerate that trend, that will not change. But you are already seeing anti-immigration sentiment. The fact that visas are difficult to get for a lot of people.

[00:04:45] Students are finding it difficult to move from the global south to the north. Those trends, I think, will accentuate and get worse. So on globalization, I wouldn't say collapse. But I think we are seeing significant changes to the way you and I understood globalization thus far. Right. I'm tempted to ask you, sir, do you subscribe to the great person theory of history

[00:05:10] or perhaps the opposite end of it, which means that a series of factors come together and cause this person to do certain things, right? So and depending on what side of the spectrum you lie, I mean, is there like a causation to everything that we are seeing right now? Do you think that it's perhaps Trump's election in 2016 that upended the order or is it COVID? What would you identify the cause as? I would say among the two things that you mentioned, the second thing is much more important.

[00:05:39] I see President Trump as being one of the factors, but it would be wrong to kind of pretend, as many people do, that the world began when President Trump was inaugurated. That, I think, is a mistake. A lot of these trends were happening even before the election of President Trump. But I think a lot of these things have gotten accentuated. It's true. And that is something we must take note of. But among the two things, it's the second thing that you mentioned.

[00:06:09] It is the structural factors at play that a geopolitical analyst must try and identify and see if he can make sense, he or she can make sense. It's not always easy. But I think even in the power shift that is happening from, let us say, the West to the East, the kind of groupings that are being formed in the Global South,

[00:06:37] the kind of technology that is being invented, innovated, but then spread or disseminated, the influence of AI, I would be inclined to think that it is the structural factors that lead to much greater changes rather than just personalities. And, you know, you've spoken about a non-polar world, right? And there are these different groupings that are coming to be at this point of time,

[00:07:06] some opportunistic, some strategic. Well, I think all opportunistic in some sense, right? What does it mean for countries like us? You know, one way of thinking about it is that the existing order is collapsing and this is a period of chaos and we have to take things as it comes. But the other also an advantageous way of viewing things is, hey, we are now the fourth largest economy in the world, growing at seven plus percent.

[00:07:34] We have a greater leverage to negotiate, right? I mean, so, you know, what does this mean for countries like India? I still stick to my position that I think this is a non-polar world, really. I think we had a bipolar world and then there was a unipolar world. I think there was an attempt at some point to think of the world as G2.

[00:07:59] But despite all that, I still think you can describe the U.S. and China as two poles, but they don't behave like two poles in unison. So that is what made me think that we are in a non-polar world rather than a bipolar or a multipolar world. We are yet to move to a settled multipolar world. Hopefully that will happen at some point, but we are not there yet.

[00:08:29] And your question as to how India should navigate this non-polar world, if you like, I think it will have to be more of multi-alignment, more of strategic autonomy, and really more of India trying to get together with like-minded countries on an issue-based coalition and trying to shape the rules of the road.

[00:08:57] So I completely believe that India is doing the right thing by having the Quad meeting today as it did. I think we are doing the right thing by assuming the presidency of BRICS and trying to see whatever we can do there. And we've done an excellent thing by signing free trade agreements with the European Union,

[00:09:24] with the UK, and our Commerce Minister was just in Canada trying to wrap up and proceed towards a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. I'm mentioning all this because all these pieces of the puzzle, including our Prime Minister stopping at the United Arab Emirates for a few hours, which I think is a very significant partner in that region.

[00:09:50] All of these things result in India trying to navigate this non-polar world. So until we have a settled multipolar world, I am of the view that India has no choice except to multi-align, which means we try and align ourselves to different countries in different parts of the world, depending on the issue.

[00:10:18] And I think that is what we are doing. Just one follow-up to that. You know, when we talk about non-polar, right? I mean, this is in direct contrast to, let's say, I mean, how it was, you know, erstwhile US on one side and erstwhile USSR on the other side. And you had to pick sides or, I mean, you could famously be non-aligned, right? But what you are saying is something different. You are saying that these two powers, let's say US and China,

[00:10:46] are not acting like the US and USSR of the past, right? And we don't have two camps at this point of time. Rather, we have an alignment of interests between these different groupings, right? I mean, whether it's regional or country-based, based on values and interests, right? Do you think that this will coalesce into a multipolar world at some point of time? And what will that look like?

[00:11:12] I mean, do you think that you would have these very logical groupings in that sense? Let's say the, you know, Global South might have a certain grouping. The North might have a different grouping and so on. So that's a very good question and it's a tough question as well. But let me attempt an answer. I think what you are seeing currently is a fragmentation of the world order.

[00:11:38] So it is fragmenting in the case of politics. That is in terms of the United Nations not working. And therefore, you have a lot of other groupings. UN Security Council is not doing its job, obviously. So you have a number of other groupings like the G20 and the G7 and the Quad, I would say, or even BRICS and so on.

[00:12:02] The other thing that is happening is that in the absence of the two powers getting their act together to solve international issues like climate change or terrorism or public health, these are issues which demand international cooperation. And in all the 40 years that I have dealt with international relations and geopolitics,

[00:12:28] this is the first time I'm seeing there is such a tremendous deficit of international cooperation and multilateral cooperation when it comes to dealing with the big issues, that is climate change, public health, terrorism and so on. I've never seen a situation like this where countries are simply not coming together and doing their bit. So in these circumstances, the tough question that you have posed to me is,

[00:12:58] how will this evolve? Will it coalesce to become a kind of a loose multipolar world or are we going to be in this situation for a long time? Unfortunately, I have to say somewhat pessimistically that we may be in this situation for a while. I don't know for how long, but there is absolutely no light at the end of the tunnel.

[00:13:26] I don't want to sound pessimistic, but I don't see an end game for this. We have such a fragmentation when it comes to AI, technology, to war and peace, to the issues of the day on each of these issues. Ukraine, you've got the Middle East, you've got climate change, you've got the big issues of AI and technology.

[00:13:52] In each of those issues, what we are seeing is fragmentation. And therefore, I'm not able to say with any degree of certainty that in the next, let's say, three or four years, the world will come together and coalesce, as you say, to use the word that you use. I wish I could say that, but I have no confidence and I will be dishonest if I said to you that in the next two or three years,

[00:14:21] we will see an end to this fragmentation. So fragmentation and conflict, to my mind, speaking as of today with the available evidence in front of me, I have to say fragmentation and conflict are set to continue for a while. Yeah, it certainly seems so, sir. I mean, as you have spoken earlier, right? Forget about the big issues of, you know, climate change and terrorism, but even something as a straight or foremost,

[00:14:49] which used to be a public good earlier, is contested territory right now, right? I mean, people want to extract their pound of flesh. And it seems like there is a leadership vacuum. And do you think that India can step up, step in and play the role of a Vishwa Guru, right? I mean, do you think that we should shape things as you have written, you know, in your blogs and so on? I mean, how do we go about doing that?

[00:15:16] So I would have to give you a realistic answer, not an idealistic answer. I think India's ability or the word that is often used these days, which is agency, you know, the power that countries have to shape the rules of the road. Certainly in some areas, I believe India is extremely well positioned to shape the rules of the road and become a Vishwa Guru.

[00:15:44] The subject that comes to mind is digital public infrastructure, where I think we can certainly set the rules of the road, at least for the global South. AI, if we play it correctly, I think India could have, actually India could come up with a model that is actually very suitable for countries of the global South in AI, where we neither believe it should be completely state-led

[00:16:13] or should it be completely left to the market. So I think a middle path, if you like, can be done by, in these areas, India has every chance and potential to become a Vishwa Guru, as you say. But I think, I'll be frank in talking to you, Roshan, that the fact that 800, sorry, 800 million people today

[00:16:40] are availing of the Prime Minister's Garib Kalyan Yojana, which is the delivery of one kilo of lentils and five kilos of coarse grains, that is the biggest challenge that India faces. If in a population of 1.5 billion people, 800 million people are going to be dependent on dole, then I think it acts as a drag

[00:17:09] on the ability of India to shape the rules of the road. So the biggest challenge India faces is that we must have economic growth, but we must have inclusive economic growth, so that you don't have this number of people in poverty, which acts as a drag on your ability to be Vishwa Guru. I think the government appreciates this

[00:17:38] and that's why they've come up with so many programs which are aimed at actually accelerating economic growth. I also believe that no crisis should be allowed to go to waste. So the current crisis actually offers India an opportunity. I have often called it a 1991 redux moment. In 1991, India was forced to reform

[00:18:08] because we were broke and we had no choice but to do away with the license, Raj. And everybody now appreciates that that was a good thing that India did. I believe this is another 1991 moment, which is why in my writings I have said that India must grab the reform by its neck and carry out the deep-seated reforms

[00:18:36] that India has put off for so long. They relate to land, they relate to infrastructure, they relate to investment, they relate to agriculture, I can go on and on. But those are well known to the government, the policy makers and the people. So, Roshan, this is a time for India to bite the bullet. We cannot postpone the difficult reforms anymore. We have to do it.

[00:19:04] The whole world is reformed and has gone ahead. So, we cannot be the only ones who say that reforms are difficult, political consensus is difficult, people have to bear the pain. You decide who has to bear the pain. That is government's prerogative. But having decided that, we must not look back and we must go forward with these reforms. Yes, absolutely. I think, you know, on one of the previous

[00:19:33] podcasts we recorded, the guest referenced a Singaporean minister saying that, you know, India's greatest challenge is her large size and her glorious history, right? That, you know, something of a crisis is what perhaps will get us off our back and get us to implement some of these factor market reforms that you mentioned, right? Which will require consensus and large scale change as such. Sir, but in the absence

[00:20:03] of institutions and edifices that we so long took for granted, let's say the United Nations or the WTO and so on, which certainly are kind of crumbling, what do we do? I mean, do you think that there is a meaningful replacement, you know, to some of these institutions and so on? Or we are just still trying to figure ways of working to operate independently? No, what you say is right. Much to my regret, I have to admit

[00:20:33] to you that multilateral institutions and multilateralism has collapsed. I cannot honestly tell you that the United Nations is performing its core mandate. I cannot honestly tell you that the WTO is doing its job. Everybody knows they are not. The alternative is unfortunately each country for itself and devil take the hindmost. And that is the most unfortunate

[00:21:02] thing about today's world. But I would say that India is doing whatever it can in trying to, as I said, form coalitions of the willing. that's the only thing a country like India can do. Bear in mind that although we are the fourth largest economy of the world, the first two economies are so huge. The United States is a 30 trillion economy.

[00:21:33] China is a 20, 22 trillion economy. And then we come to India, Germany, others which are 4 to 5 trillion. So there is a big gap between the two giants and the others. India's challenge is how to punch above its weight given the fact that we are only a 4 or a 4.5 trillion economy. And that places inherent limits on how

[00:22:02] India can make a difference in these rejuvenation of these multilateral institutions, frankly. And that is why while India is doing what it can, it would be unfair to expect India to bear the load by itself. That is not possible. Unfortunately, it is US and China and the others which must bear the predominant load of reestablishing

[00:22:32] or rejuvenating these multilateral institutions. One of the reasons why multilateralism has failed is because of its inherent inability to reform itself. If you take the UN Security Council, everybody knows that the UN Security Council has got permanent members, some of whom have no business being there. They were only there because they were victors of the World War II. Similarly, in the WTO, you have

[00:23:01] to reform the WTO. And reform means you have to reform the negotiating function, you have to reform the dispute settlement function. And so, all this means that some of the countries which had legacy rights and privileges have to be willing to give it up. And that is proving to be difficult. But I'm an optimist in the medium to long term because I think those changes have to happen. There is no

[00:23:31] other option, there is no other alternative to the reform of these institutions. Right. From everything you have said, sir, I think our ability to negotiate will be the single biggest determinant for us going into the future. And as someone who has been a practitioner for close to four decades now, I would love to get an insider's perspective on what goes into it. I mean, now let's assume that a couple of countries are negotiating. What happens

[00:24:00] behind closed doors? If you can just walk us through the process and so on, you know, from a lay person's perspective. Thank you very much for that question. I'm happy to address it. I also want to take advantage of your question to say that I wrote a book on how India negotiates. It was called India's moment. And I would like to take advantage of your question to say that it's a HarperCollins India book. And it is 2023 December

[00:24:30] and it was launched by the external of as minister, Dr. S. Jai Shankar. It's a book that I would recommend for those who are interested in the answer to your question, which is how does India negotiate? But let me respond to the question you have posed. Look at one level nations are not very different from individuals at one level. Individuals have self-interest, nations have national interest. That's the only difference.

[00:25:00] So when you walk into a negotiation, Roshan, you basically seek a brief from the government. That brief from whatever the ministry is, if it is a WTO negotiation, it is the Ministry of Commerce which will give you that brief. If it's an environment negotiation, it will be the Ministry of Environment and Forest which will give you that brief. If it's a political negotiation,

[00:25:30] it's the Ministry of External Affairs which will give you that brief. That brief ideally will consist two or three components. One, it will give you core non-negotiable interests interests of India. That is interests of India which are considered non-negotiable which is the basic minimum that you expect to achieve.

[00:25:59] in an ideal world that should not be a long list. It can only be one or two. You can't have ten issues and say all ten are non-negotiable for India. Then why do you go into a negotiation? It makes no sense. So you will have one or two. But I think then you want a set of issues which India considers important but which India is capable of negotiating in exchange for some

[00:26:28] concessions. So you must have an idea not only about what you are willing to concede but you must also have an excellent idea of what you are hoping to get in return. This is important. In the WTO in particular India has been described as a naysayer. That is we say no to everything. That is the unfortunate perception.

[00:26:58] My book addresses that issue as to why we are called naysayers and I have explained in my book as to why it is wrong to call India a naysayer. I have also explained the drivers of Indian negotiating stance. Among the drivers I would emphasize two or three. One I called it the poverty veto. It's an expression to which I

[00:27:28] hopefully have the copyright. Nobody else has used it but I'm using it because if there are 500, 600 million people in India who are poor not extreme poverty but poverty. then it is my duty as an Indian negotiator not to make their position worse than what it is. No matter what you are negotiating I cannot come back after an international negotiation

[00:27:57] and tell these 500 million people that you are living on $2 a day from tomorrow you will live on $1 a day. That is unacceptable. We know their situation is already bad so my duty must be to improve their lot not to allow their situation to deteriorate. Then there is a geopolitical factor. Obviously if you are going to buy Russian oil in an ideal world you will do what you

[00:28:26] can or what you want but the world is full of countries which have their own interests. If some countries if European countries come and tell you you know we have a problem with Russia can you buy less oil from them can you do other things you have to negotiate I am not saying you will necessarily give up Russian oil but I am trying to tell you how geopolitics plays a role in India's negotiation. Then of course you

[00:28:56] also have domestic politics. Let's not this is a rough and tumble democracy you are talking about India. If you take a position the opposition parties are going to criticize the government for having taken those positions and even reforms like agriculture reforms the current government you will remember brought good bills very reasonable farm bills but they had to be taken back by the government because of protests.

[00:29:25] So that is part and parcel of democracy isn't it? You will have to create political consensus for Indian negotiating positions. So these factors I have not mentioned other factors like factors of principle for example and sometimes you can also have factors which are based on the state of the industry. Can you really get rid of coal in India? India? In the climate change negotiations in

[00:29:54] Paris in which I was involved one of the demands made was that India should get rid of coal and that is almost an impossible proposition considering that the 60 to 70 percent of electricity or power is actually generated from coal even today. So that is not something we can accept. So you have a whole range of factors which weigh on India's negotiating position. But once you enter the negotiating room

[00:30:23] then it is a question of two things. One, do you have the clout to get your objectives? Where you don't have the clout you have to get into alliances with other countries which are like-minded because you don't have the clout to achieve those objectives all by yourself. And finally, what is the international consensus? consensus and do you want to be the only country to go

[00:30:53] against that international consensus? So I think all these things come to play but without taking too much time I would once again draw the attention of your viewers to my book. It's not an expensive book and it does give you some idea about how India negotiates. I have given three examples. One is WTO, the other is climate change and the third is the conflict on Ukraine where India took positions where if you remember we did not condemn

[00:31:23] Russia by name and I have explained why we did not condemn Russia when Russia invaded Ukraine and how we have managed this problem. Can you talk us through some of the most difficult negotiations you have had sir? I mean you mentioned our stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict for example. Could you talk us through a few examples of where it was extremely difficult and how we got through them? So the first, I'll give you two

[00:31:52] examples because they are personal and I was involved. The first one was the intellectual property rights declaration in Doha in the ministerial conference, the WTO ministerial conference in Doha. We had to negotiate a declaration on TRIPS and public health. TRIPS stands for trade-related intellectual property rights, TRIPS and public health. that particular

[00:32:21] ministerial meeting the minister at the time decided that I should represent India and he sent me to the lion's den as it were the negotiating group at two o'clock in the morning and that was for me the toughest moment. I was relatively young. I was only 40 years old and you have to bear the burden of representing your country on a sensitive subject like intellectual property rights

[00:32:50] where you have a huge generic industry, a pharmaceutical industry and what the western countries were interested was to actually shrink the space for generics and increase the space for patented medicines. But if you increase the space for patented medicines in a country like India at the expense of generics, then your public health objectives take a hit.

[00:33:20] You cannot achieve your public health objectives. So that to me was the most difficult negotiation I've attended. I'm proud and happy to tell you that finally the declaration that we were able to come up with in Doha 2001 has stood the test of time. It is still quoted by government of India. Even now we say that we don't want to go beyond the Doha declaration on trips and public health. So that is something

[00:33:50] that I'm terribly proud of. The second issue which was difficult for India was the Paris climate change negotiations. I was not directly involved but I was indirectly involved because I was ambassador of India to Paris and I was sitting in on all of the meetings along with the team from Delhi on the COP 21 negotiations as they were called. And there again our objective was to ensure

[00:34:19] that the outcome of the Paris climate change accords was broadly consistent with three things. One, common but differentiated responsibility what is known as CBDR that India would not be made to assume burdens which are disproportionate. Second, that whatever obligations India assumes in climate change will not

[00:34:48] interfere with India's fundamental right to development for its poor people. And last but not least that India will keep open the possibility of getting millions of dollars in climate finance. So we actually joined the Paris agreement with two I would not say reservations because reservations were not allowed but in our acceptance of

[00:35:18] the Paris climate change accords we have made these two points. We have said India's entry into the Paris climate change accords is contingent on number one, our right to development. That is we have to develop poor people in India. We can't afford to take responsibility which will interfere with that. And secondly, we have made the point that our assumption of responsibilities

[00:35:48] at the Paris climate change accords is contingent on outside world giving us money and giving us technology. Because we cannot do this all by ourselves. We are a poor country. We need tremendous finance. We need access to technology. And it's only then that we will be able to meet our obligations under climate change. So those are the two challenging situations where I'm happy to say that I think we came out reasonably

[00:36:18] all right given the kind of situation we found ourselves in. Yeah, definitely very consequential negotiations for India I would say. And you know earlier you mentioned that obviously we're a loud noisy democracy right? And given your framework of non-negotiables and let's say everything else, is there bipartisan consensus usually politically on at least the non-negotiables? Do you think that you know the parties

[00:36:47] on either side of the aisle tend to agree on that broadly? Is there an India consensus on that or is it still a little fractured? And what does it take to kind of you know solder that consensus? So I would begin by saying that in the Indian political system we do not need the approval of the parliament before we enter into

[00:37:17] an international agreement. So the ruling party need not ask the opposition listen do I have your approval for entering into an agreement on environment or WTO or whatever. This is true regardless of which party is in power. So that is called the executive style of functioning where the Indian executive that is the government of the day has the broad powers to

[00:37:46] enter into an international agreement. Where the parliament comes into the picture in India is when laws have to be amended. So for example India joining the Uruguay round meant that we had to amend our patents act. We had to move from process patents to product patents. So that means the government has to go to

[00:38:16] the parliament and get the bill approved in the parliament and that requires discussions with the opposition and opposition consent and so on. So this is the background. Your question as to whether there is a pre-existing consensus between government and opposition I would say it is just an understanding in the minds of politicians that's all. Because this is one issue on which again I have written

[00:38:46] in my book that this idea is not an original idea. It's an idea that I got from the late president Pranab Mukherjee with whom I was traveling in a plane and he came up with this idea and said it's high time that India calls an all party meeting and decides that some issues are so important for national interest that there will be no attempt by

[00:39:15] any party to politicize it. For example land reform. Everybody knows land reforms have to happen in India. It's very important for getting investment for enabling ease of business etc. But whichever party is in power they try to do something the opposition immediately jumps on them and says no this is not good. So maybe your question is a very very important one and I am saying the time has come for an all party

[00:39:45] meeting in India to decide on at least some three or four issues not too many because it is democracy because it is politics everything is political that's fine but there must be two or three issues maybe one issue can be Kashmir the second issue can be economic reforms the third issue can be how do you reform agriculture for example. On this we need an all party consensus

[00:40:14] it's only then that India can move forward. So I think the time has come your question is more important than what people normally recognize I am grateful to you for posing this question because I genuinely think at least on a handful of issues we need an all party consensus so that those issues regardless of which government is in power they can carry out those reforms without fear or favor and

[00:40:44] not worry about opposition. Right. So having been in these negotiations and it feels like a very high responsibility role what makes someone an effective negotiator? You know is it a combination of let's say psychological you know makeup? Is it a combination of being well read on certain topics? Is it relationships? Is it a mix of all of these or you know what makes an effective negotiator in

[00:41:13] your opinion? So some qualities are obvious. For example you need to be a good communicator. It doesn't matter which language but hopefully the English language because if you are talking in international fora you can't speak in an Indian language you have to speak in English. So communication is important because you ought to be able to communicate your concerns your objectives your interests in an unambiguous manner.

[00:41:43] So I would say some qualities are obvious. You need to be a good communicator. You need to be an extrovert. You need to have charm. You need to have persuasive ability and so on. Those are standard normal. But there I have noticed the issue actually becomes very important is number one clarity of objectives. What do you want from the negotiations?

[00:42:13] This is easier said than done Broshan. Many times a lot of government negotiators are not clear. So clarity of objectives is one. Second I would say is trust. I have always felt can you try and elicit the trust of your opposite number or your interlocutor. The other people with whom you are negotiating they should be able to trust you which means

[00:42:42] you should be able to state the truth. You cannot be tactical about this by saying that today you are objecting to some proposal and tomorrow you accept it. Then they will say okay this man doesn't mean what he's saying. So I would say trust and last but not least I would also say say you have to have empathy. That is the ability to understand the objectives of others.

[00:43:11] You are not the only one in the room. You are not the only country with interest in the room. There are other countries. We have to be respectful of other countries interests and try and see how they can be accommodated. Without clarity, trust and empathy I believe you have lost the game because then it becomes it's my way or the highway. You walk into a meeting and you say these are the objectives. If I don't get it, I'm out. That is not negotiation.

[00:43:41] That smacks of being a dictator or authoritarianism and that doesn't help in a multilateral forum. So in addition, I would say one last thing. Your ability to build alliances are very important. Can you build alliances with Africa? Can you build alliances with your neighboring countries? Can you build alliances with superpowers? Russia, China, US. I think all those require different skills. So if India wants

[00:44:11] to be a leader of the global south, for example, we should be able to inspire the trust of the countries of the south and that calls for a very special skill. You should be able to build alliances within the global south and that's not easy. But that comes out of experience as well. It's not something you can pick up in one or two years. And that is why diplomacy is such a difficult profession. I don't agree with people that anybody can be made an ambassador overnight. There's nothing great.

[00:44:41] I think it's a profession like any other. After all, you don't make somebody suddenly a CEO of Microsoft, right? You don't do that. So why would you assume that suddenly somebody can become the ambassador to US or ambassador to Paris or ambassador to Japan? This is a profession like anything else and that calls for certain skills. And those skills are cultivated, honed and perfected over years, over a number of years.

[00:45:10] Yeah, I think this is one thing that people perhaps miss on social platforms. They assume that it's a schoolyard fight between bullies and that we should take strong positions irrespective of what leverage we have, right? But speaking about the kind of folks we have representing our interests, I think today we source these folks from the public examinations and we have the IFS Carter that is going out there

[00:45:40] and doing the best for us. Do you think that this is indeed the best way going forward as well or do you think that we should probably widen our ambit to include folks from private professions, folks who have established professionals from other domains and so on so that we can add a little bit of variety to the negotiating team itself? So my view on that is that the task of international

[00:46:09] negotiations should fall on the diplomats. I have no doubt about it. I think they are the best position to advance the negotiation. Where I think you make a good point is that diplomats, civil servants and the government should be open to receiving advice and expertise from outside. That we are doing things are definitely better today than they were let us say 20 years ago.

[00:46:38] But I think the government of India can do much better by allowing these people to come up with briefs, provide inputs and where possible we should also take them as part of our delegation. There is no harm. If there is a environmental expert, he or she should be part of the delegation for going to meetings of the UN on environment.

[00:47:06] Similarly, if you have an economist who has spent 20 years doing international trade, there is no harm in taking his advice when it comes to India's negotiating position. After all, civil servants and diplomats need not be the only preserves of knowledge. Knowledge comes from people who have spent 20-30 years doing the subject. And as you know, Roshan, the Indian system is a little peculiar.

[00:47:36] You can actually have a district collector suddenly become an ambassador to WTO. It can happen because the administrative service is like that. Similarly, in the foreign service, you can have an ambassador to Colombia suddenly being sent to do nuclear disarmament negotiations. It can happen. So we should keep that in mind and allow for expertise and flow of ideas

[00:48:06] from outside. As I said, I'm happy to report to you that things are much better today than 20 years ago. But I think we can go further. We can really benefit from this cross-fertilization of ideas as you say. But our government system does not allow private people to come and negotiate for the government. That will be difficult. given the political administrative system in which we operate.

[00:48:35] That may be asking too much. But I absolutely agree with you that we should have more consultations with industry bodies, with academics, with experts and others so that we have enough knowledge to be able to buttress our negotiating positions. Right. So we in effect will not be able to do something like what the US has done in recent terms. Let's say

[00:49:07] someone like a private person like Jared Kushner going and negotiating the Abraham Accords for instance. Right. I mean it's something that is off pale for us. I mean our system does not allow that. It is difficult. Let me put it that way. But also bear in mind the comparison with the American system is not entirely valid because in the American system people who are in government once the president changes they leave the government and they go on to

[00:49:37] the private sector and make a lot of money or get fame or whatever. Our system the civil servants remain the same. The prime minister and the defense minister and the commerce minister can change. But the civil servants remain the same. So the system is different. So the answer to your question is probably no. If you have in mind a Jared Kushner kind of situation I don't think we will have that in India. Right. Sir you have been negotiating for almost four decades now.

[00:50:06] How have you seen India's negotiating leverage improve over the last 10-20 years? Right. And if so today I mean when we talk to countries is there a recognition of that and also if you can just like talk about a couple of anecdotes that reinforce that. So I want to begin by saying Indian negotiators are considered good. I don't know if the Indian public in India recognizes that Indian

[00:50:35] negotiators are good but the whole world recognizes that Indian negotiators are good. Regardless of whether they are from the foreign service or from commerce ministry wherever you can chat with others they will all uniformly tell you that listen Indian negotiators are tough and that it is not easy negotiating with them they are attached to the idea of national interest etc. Having said that you have to understand that the negotiating

[00:51:05] clout comes from economic and military clout. If it is a defense negotiation it will come from military clout but otherwise we are talking economic clout. my contention is that we are still a small economy compared to the size of the country. We have 1.5 billion people but we are only a 4 trillion economy or a 4.5 trillion economy.

[00:51:35] To put it in perspective the market cap of NVIDIA is 4 trillion dollars and you are a 4 trillion economy. So I don't want to underestimate what we have achieved. I think we are a significant economy but the negotiating leverage comes not from 4 trillion. It comes from the potential of the Indian market. Potential. That is

[00:52:04] imagine if another 300 million people in India were to buy mobile phones, cars and air conditioners. naturally Samsung will be very interested. They will say my god which other country is going to offer 300 million more customers to me. That is the leverage of India which is why India must keep growing and must achieve inclusive economic growth. I told you in response to one

[00:52:34] of your earliest questions that poverty veto 500 million people. We must make sure that these 500 million people emerge from poverty and become rich and become good consumers because that is what gives me negotiating leverage. My negotiating leverage today is small because our middle class is only 200 or 300 million people. I need a middle class of 800 million people.

[00:53:04] It's only then that I can go to WTO climate change and I can negotiate from a position of strength. So I would say that is the key. The key is if you ask me frankly what is the one important goal for Indian foreign policy or national interest I will say economic growth. Nothing else. Nothing else matters to me. If we can grow from if we can

[00:53:33] grow at 9 to 10 percent for the next 10 years that is the only foreign policy interest that matters. Everything else is secondary. Whether you become a member of the permanent security council etc is irrelevant. If you grow at 9 to 10 percent in the next 10 years the whole world will be at your feet. You know that. I know that. Because the market will be so big China is already saturated so we will be the biggest market and that is what is going to drive negotiating leverage.

[00:54:03] I believe I don't want to get into details but to answer your question I believe this is the negotiating leverage that India has used well in either the WTO negotiations or the climate change negotiations. It is this potential where we are capable of becoming a market of let us say 600-700 million rich consumers. That is the real potential of India. that is what

[00:54:32] bestows negotiating leverage for Indian negotiators. Yeah I agree with you sir. I think economic growth is a panacea of all ills I would say. Every kind of leverage will get built along the way for sure. But you know we are seeing post COVID especially right that countries are prioritizing resilience strategic autonomy and so on right. I mean and this sometimes comes at the cost of pure economic efficiency markets let's say as you say.

[00:55:03] It is a very difficult thing for us to figure you know what is the right balance between both of these. So would you have some thoughts on that? No I think as far as India is concerned we have to follow the middle path. Leaving it entirely to the private sector has some disadvantages for India. Because some of the big conglomerates might then adopt monopolistic tendencies and so on.

[00:55:33] But having said that I will make two points. One bureaucratic red tape has not yet disappeared in India. It has reduced and diminished but it has not disappeared. It must be our collective endeavor to make sure that bureaucratic red tape does not prevent investment, does not prevent entrepreneurs from establishing industry, does not prevent individuals from undertaking

[00:56:02] economic activity and so on. So that is bureaucratic red tape. We must attack it relentlessly so that it disappears to the extent possible. The second thing I would say is that state as an instrument of delivery has to become much more efficient. efficient. In all of the states in the Southeast Asian countries which were at India's level of development in 1970s and 80s, the state was very

[00:56:32] efficient in delivering services. So whether it is government hospitals, government schools, government institutions, the delivery of services has to be made much more efficient, corruption free and non-discriminatory. It should not depend on who you are. Anybody who goes to the government for the delivery of a service should be confident that he is going to get it in a non-discriminatory fashion, in a

[00:57:02] transparent fashion and I would say that IT, information technology, internet, that can make a big difference. If people can avail of services online, then the chances of corruption are less. After all, the government has done such a wonderful job of direct benefit transfer, DBT, only because of IT. We have completely cut off middlemen so the government can

[00:57:32] directly transfer funds to women beneficiaries without the husband or any other person coming in the way. That has been one of the main achievements actually in the last few years. So I think the state must become efficient, non-corrupt, transparent and non-discriminatory. This is highly important and I think we have some distance to travel in that sense. And the other last point I

[00:58:01] would make is that again, I talked of all the political parties coming together at least deciding on some issues. Similarly, there should be a much more harmonious relationship between the center and the states. We are a federal system at the end of the day. So you can make all the labor reforms you want at the center level. But if the states are not willing to implement it, then the whole purpose is lost. Similarly, education, similarly land, the states have an

[00:58:31] important role to play. So I think a much more harmonious federal government to state or center state relationship as we call it in India is very, very important for taking things forward. Sir, one last question, something that I have to ask you is that you have mentioned that the US-China relationship will get a lot worse before it gets better. And I feel that this will

[00:59:01] perhaps have the most bearing on the world we live in and particularly us. So how do you sort of see this panning out over the next, few months coming and perhaps the next year or so, if you were to do some crystal gazing for us, what do you foresee for us? No, I would begin by saying that the US-China relationship is undergoing

[00:59:31] important shifts. I do not see the possibility of a complete entente cordial as they say in French. You know, I don't see a situation where US-China kiss and make up. But there is a very important development in the current context and in the recent summit meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping. They have agreed to a

[01:00:00] framework which is they have chosen to call bilateral strategic stability, a relationship of bilateral strategic stability. So this mutual interest in strategic stability means they may not resolve all the problems between themselves, but they will freeze the problems and allow each country the space to do

[01:00:30] what they want. This is my simple interpretation of the summit meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping. If this interpretation is correct, then it has implications, for India because hitherto US has seen India as a counterweight to China. But if US and China decide, okay, this is the grand framework, you do your

[01:00:59] thing, I do my thing, we are not going to unnecessarily get into a conflict-like situation. It suits China, it suits America. If that is the case, then it will have some implications for India as well. India will then have to recalibrate its own relationship with US and China. With the United States, I have no doubt at all that it is one of the most important relationships for India when it comes to tech, when

[01:01:28] it comes to defense, when it comes to AI, when it comes to people-to-people ties and so on. So we will have to make sure that our relationship is free of unnecessary disturbance or vicissitudes. With China, the power differential between China and India is so big that we cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with

[01:01:58] China at this stage. We need time time to develop ourselves. So the best way to go forward with China would be to try and create our own pathway for a development which is mutually beneficial. And I think the external affairs minister, Dr. Jay Shankar, has been saying relations with China should take place on the basis of three mutuals, he calls it, mutual interest,

[01:02:28] mutual respect, and mutual sensitivity. This is the only way forward with China. So, Roshan, you have actually hit the nail on the head. The two most important relationships for India are US and China. And Indian foreign policy going forward, whether we succeed or not, will depend largely to the extent or it will depend

[01:02:58] largely in the way in which we are able to manage our relationship with China and whether India and the US can find mutually advantageous areas of cooperation and take the relationship to the next level. Right. Sir, thank you so much for taking time out of your busy day for this podcast. I really appreciate it. It was fascinating to have a practitioner's lens on everything that we are seeing right now in the world

[01:03:28] of geopolitics. So, hope to host you on Bharatwarta again. Thank you so much. Thank you, Roshan, for having me. It was a pleasure interacting with you. Thank you.