248: 100% Made-in-India Guns, The SSS Defence Story | Vivek & Dinesh (Founders, SSS Defence)

[00:00:00] In honesty, I had doubts as to whether we would be able to make a full gun model. It's a very difficult thing to do.

[00:00:05] This is the only field that I need to kill somebody. Pull the trigger, the damn thing has to fire. So reliability, reliability and reliability everywhere, right?

[00:00:14] Kill a man because you made a faulty gun, it's not acceptable.

[00:00:21] Dinesh and Vivek are the driving forces behind SSS Defence, a cutting-edge defence manufacturer based in India,

[00:00:28] specialising in small arms and ammunition. The company is focused on creating world-class products like precision sniper rifles and advanced assault weapons.

[00:00:42] Hello and welcome to a very, very special episode of the Startup Operator Podcast.

[00:00:47] As you may have noticed in the intro visuals, we didn't shoot this episode in the studio.

[00:00:52] We took the crew out to meet the good folks at SSS Defence and we literally had a blast.

[00:00:59] I spoke to a couple of the co-founders, Vivek and Dinesh, about how the company came into being.

[00:01:05] What does it take to operate in the defence sector?

[00:01:08] How does the procurement process work?

[00:01:10] You know, what the government can do to kind of help them?

[00:01:13] What they could do better building in India out of here?

[00:01:18] SSS is one of the only indigenous 100% made in India companies and plenty of other things.

[00:01:25] As you can imagine, this was a wide varying conversation, a lot of diverse insights in here that you might find interesting.

[00:01:32] Most of all, I think this is a super inspiring episode for all of us to build in India.

[00:01:40] Before I leave you, don't forget to subscribe to this channel for more such amazing content.

[00:01:45] And of course, a huge shout out to the good folks at SSS Defence for being so patient with us and for the kindness.

[00:02:00] And Dinesh, thank you so much for having us over at SSS Defence today.

[00:02:08] Thank you. I hope you'll have a good time as well.

[00:02:11] Yeah, we're already having a good time. I mean, this is one of the more interesting workspaces that I've been to for sure.

[00:02:16] The aesthetics of the workspace are quite different as well. You wouldn't find this anywhere else.

[00:02:21] Yeah, I mean, I was just saying that there are more guns here than laptops. So very unusual, very, very unusual.

[00:02:27] There's not an IT company, right? We have to have hardware there.

[00:02:31] Yeah, yeah. But yeah, I mean, it's amazing. I also sense that there's a bit of a shift in terms of like, you know, manufacturing becoming a little more sexier right now, right?

[00:02:42] And not just undue focus on IT software exports and so on and so forth.

[00:02:46] So I'm very happy to talk to, you know, folks like yourself who are like cutting material as they say, right? So awesome.

[00:02:56] So a bunch of things I want to understand, right? I mean, the business, the product R&D side of things and like, you know, working with the government and so on and so forth.

[00:03:03] But I guess a good place to start would be the founding journey, right? So how do you get started? I think you were founded in 2017, right?

[00:03:11] Since then you've grown from strength to strength. So if you could just take us through how this came together and a few milestones along the way.

[00:03:17] So I think, you know, it's quite a story. But I should be, you know, I should kind of put this fact out in the open.

[00:03:26] We're not one of those, you know, typical startup stories in the sense that we owe our origin to a company which has been around for a very, very long time.

[00:03:35] So the triple S and the triple S defense comes from a company called Stump Shule and Somoppa, which is India's largest manufacturer of springs.

[00:03:43] And that's a company which was created way back in the 1950s and 1960s.

[00:03:49] The story of triple S defense came together in the year 2017, when myself, Dinesh and Satish Machani, who's the third generation promoter of Stump Shule and Somoppa,

[00:04:03] possibly, you know, sat up on a very casual note and, you know, thought about the idea of having diversification.

[00:04:12] And defense came up in the course of the conversations. And what we did right at that point in time was we really went into action more.

[00:04:21] We did not sit around, make business plan, you know, ruminate over numbers and so on and so forth.

[00:04:26] Sometimes business actually happens because you feel good about something instinctively.

[00:04:32] Dinesh and myself have known each other for a very long time.

[00:04:35] We've been fighting partners for as long as I can remember.

[00:04:38] That's right. If the two of us don't fight on an average day, then that day is bad for us. Right.

[00:04:44] So that's that's also the other thing.

[00:04:46] You mean like physically fight?

[00:04:47] No, never do that.

[00:04:49] Never fight.

[00:04:50] Yeah, it's always, you know, never, never get back at the messenger.

[00:04:54] It's always a message. Right.

[00:04:55] So we can fight and we can get back, pick him back and, you know, drop him back home as well.

[00:05:01] Nice. So this was almost like an incubation of sorts, right?

[00:05:07] Within the larger manufacturing facility as such.

[00:05:11] But why small arms? You know, I mean, there's perhaps even within defense that you could look at plenty of things.

[00:05:17] But what is the opportunity in small arms?

[00:05:19] So you got to understand that Stamshulisov, the triplest parent company, had built a legacy in metallurgy and springs in fabrication and manufacture.

[00:05:34] And the heart of every gun is a spring. So that's that's where the journey can start it.

[00:05:40] So since they were already good at making springs and, you know, built a legacy for 65 years at that point, we used and leveraged what they already had to complete weapon systems.

[00:05:55] And they would already sit, you know, manufacturing springs for magazines with the Arabian companies.

[00:06:01] They were making links and springs for the Indian artlets factories.

[00:06:06] So we thought, let's, you know, continue the process and notale it into a more sophisticated program.

[00:06:12] So making competence. Now we make products. That's the story.

[00:06:17] But you should understand this, right? Moving away from a competent manufacturer to being a whole product manufacturer.

[00:06:23] That was a real challenge. It's a simple thing.

[00:06:27] You know, you know, wheels make a car, right?

[00:06:29] So springs like that, but then you want to build a car over the wheels, you know, a wheel company cannot make a become a car manufacturer.

[00:06:36] He's going to run through a whole cycle of things before he gets there.

[00:06:40] That was our journey. Took a long time, a lot of effort before it turned out to be a product.

[00:06:45] And that's also the reason why we house the defense vertically completely on its own.

[00:06:51] So it had to be a standalone outfit. It had to have its own culture, which has got to be a product management and a product development kind of a culture.

[00:06:58] Right. And that also was a conscious decision of ours at that point in time, which is paid off.

[00:07:03] Right.

[00:07:03] Something that I would like to kind of emphasize upon is this, right?

[00:07:06] Early on in our phase of growth, myself and Dinesh, we went through a certain period of time when we, you know, in honesty, had doubts as to whether we would be able to make a full gun or not.

[00:07:21] That's the fact, right? Let's let me, let me lay this very bluntly.

[00:07:26] There were enough people at that point in time from the forces is also from the other competitor OEM landscape who must have come across and told us, you know, we've got a history of 100 years making guns.

[00:07:37] What do you guys have as a history? You know, fine. Springs is okay. All that is fine.

[00:07:42] But have you made guns before? It's a very difficult thing to do. Matter of fact, very difficult thing to do. Right.

[00:07:48] But what we did at that point in time was consciously get into doing our own R&D and trying to make our own systems from ground up.

[00:07:57] And one of the reasons and actually one of the things which made it very simple for us was the fact that, you know, getting into a joint venture or a technology transfer to that point in time brought us face to face with what is called international trade and arms regulations.

[00:08:10] That is one of the simplest ways in which international OEMs want to give you technology transfer, but basically prevent you from getting the key parts of a weapon.

[00:08:19] And Dinesh can talk about his own experiences. I think we should talk about, you know, the experiences that we've had.

[00:08:26] Wouldn't that have been simpler? I mean, just to pick up like a con, like do a JV with a like an international arms manufacturer, you know, and do like a contract manufacturing kind of a thing.

[00:08:36] I mean, like, I think perhaps Adani and Poonjolaj and the likes of them are already doing.

[00:08:41] So you guys are like when you say indigenous, you are like 100% indigenous.

[00:08:46] Yeah.

[00:08:46] Yeah, it's not difficult to sign a JV, but the point is, it's fairly, it's one of the tools that every country uses.

[00:08:58] Russians have their own, Americans have their own, Germans have their own laws to regulate arms trade worldwide.

[00:09:05] And that is not to trade off. I mean, there's nothing to regulate arms trade. Germans went and set up the Pakistani Ordnance Factory.

[00:09:15] The Americans went and supplies weapons to everybody in this restaurant.

[00:09:20] It's just used as a tool to hold back business, hold back manufacturing or transfer of technology to another country.

[00:09:28] So they would never let go of that. It's a, it's a, it's just a barrier. It's a couple of firewalls.

[00:09:35] They build up so that you don't acquire it. And we didn't do our JV.

[00:09:39] We started with a company called Lewis Machine Tools, based out of Mylan, just out of Chicago.

[00:09:47] We just realized that ITAR was so cumbersome and so draconian that we would not have access to even you want to build a small part,

[00:09:56] the way it could be six months and sometimes you wouldn't get the permissions.

[00:10:00] So we decided that we took a call sometime in 2018 and that we will come back and start building on our own.

[00:10:10] The funny part about all this is that, okay, we're talking about a product,

[00:10:14] but nobody knew how to even build a gun, you know, a weapons facility or just the architecture here,

[00:10:21] how to build a range. We are in the middle of the IT corridor.

[00:10:24] You can't be shooting outside. So we had to go in, go down underground.

[00:10:30] Everything has been laid out. Our machine layouts were all designed specifically to cater to a need.

[00:10:36] The PDR was designed to cater to a particular need.

[00:10:39] So security systems around here,

[00:10:41] nobody even knew what was perimeter security for an industry.

[00:10:45] They knew it for airports, but there are no regulations for an industry.

[00:10:49] So that had to be designed and built into the system.

[00:10:52] So I think by the time we finished the physical infrastructure,

[00:10:55] we'd spent two years.

[00:10:57] And then by the time we started, so parallelly,

[00:11:00] we were also working on how to build a team that could design and build weapon systems.

[00:11:06] And the R&D process was very organic first.

[00:11:09] It was all about failures, right?

[00:11:11] But here is a point that you have to understand,

[00:11:14] making a full drawn weapon in India, that was something out of your own R&D.

[00:11:19] In a country like India, we were strapped with several challenges.

[00:11:23] One of the biggest challenges is that until you build your own range,

[00:11:27] you basically have to kind of go back and find,

[00:11:30] design it, cut metal, go there, fire, see what exactly is happening.

[00:11:34] Right.

[00:11:34] You'll have failures, you've got to correct those failures and so on.

[00:11:37] Right. So the initial stages,

[00:11:38] we did have some challenges with regard to that.

[00:11:41] Getting hold of ammunition was one of the more difficult things for us.

[00:11:43] Right.

[00:11:44] But then yes, there was support that we got from the forces in certain ways,

[00:11:47] because I guess back in 2019,

[00:11:49] and immediately after COVID, there was substantial impetus from the forces as well.

[00:11:54] When I say forces, I'm talking about the user, right?

[00:11:56] The user also wanted to try and see as to how the indigenous suppliers could support,

[00:12:02] you know, their interest.

[00:12:04] And so we did get that initial support.

[00:12:06] But the fact of the matter is this, we don't become an OEM by doing that, right?

[00:12:10] You become an OEM when you have the ability to do that all in-house.

[00:12:14] Right.

[00:12:14] So today, as we stand today, we are the only Indian private sector company,

[00:12:20] one which has its own weapon R&D center, the only private company in India which makes its own weapons,

[00:12:29] designs, develops, manufactures and tests.

[00:12:31] The only private sector manufacturer in this country which has managed to export its indigenously designed,

[00:12:39] manufactured and tested rifle outside of India to a foreign military,

[00:12:42] and substantially more discussions happening with other foreign militaries as well.

[00:12:47] The only private sector indigenous OEM in this country,

[00:12:53] which manufactures all the way from raw material to the bad, right?

[00:12:59] Now that doesn't happen overnight.

[00:13:02] Hardware is a different story.

[00:13:03] Hardware is not about really writing code, right?

[00:13:05] I'm not saying code is easy.

[00:13:07] I'm just trying to put it as a point here.

[00:13:10] Hardware has its own times.

[00:13:13] You need to buy equipment sometimes.

[00:13:14] Sometimes you have to make your own equipment special.

[00:13:16] You can't it train as quickly basically.

[00:13:18] Right, you can't it train.

[00:13:19] And some of those difficulties have been there.

[00:13:21] And me and Dinesh have actually had the brunt of foreign governments

[00:13:25] and foreign agencies even preventing us from getting more of basic equipment.

[00:13:30] Right?

[00:13:30] Machinery you're talking about.

[00:13:32] Right.

[00:13:33] For production, for testing, for measurement devices that are stopped because you're a weapons manufacturer.

[00:13:39] Right.

[00:13:40] So there is a lot of restrictions that come in from even buying machine tools and equipment to manufacturers.

[00:13:46] Right.

[00:13:47] Not talking about the weapon itself but even the peripheral infrastructure has a lot of restrictions that we have to put.

[00:13:53] Oh I'm sure.

[00:13:54] Yeah.

[00:13:55] You know doing this.

[00:13:56] One other thing I want to do, you know, but Vivek was talking about all the processes that we ran through.

[00:14:05] Even before we hit the R&D phase, right?

[00:14:08] Then you also have to deal with the licensing process in India.

[00:14:13] Right.

[00:14:13] You can't just build a gun.

[00:14:14] Yeah.

[00:14:14] You know, it has two days here.

[00:14:16] The government has to issue an industrial license to manufacture.

[00:14:21] And then you definitely need the approved testing rates.

[00:14:25] It's like I want to build a Formula One car without a track.

[00:14:28] I'm not going to put the car and have the car in the garage.

[00:14:31] You know, it's never going to go out.

[00:14:32] So the VTR is almost like a test track, like a racetrack.

[00:14:37] That is the most important thing more than the other R&D that we do that that's the place where you actually take it to fire.

[00:14:45] And all that, what you get as data is what is inculcated into our manufacturing processes.

[00:14:51] Right.

[00:14:52] So very critical that all this dovetails into a program that, you know, make the first arms company that will do everything in India.

[00:15:01] Right.

[00:15:02] And yes, you can buy all the equipment, all the machinery that you want.

[00:15:06] Right.

[00:15:07] All the fancy stuff that you might see in international gun factories.

[00:15:10] There's a certain process which is involved.

[00:15:11] That process needs to be evolving, fine-tuning all the time.

[00:15:15] Right.

[00:15:17] And I think defense is different from a lot of other product development in the sense that failure is the main reason why you get better.

[00:15:25] Right.

[00:15:26] Multiple failures make you even better.

[00:15:28] So, I mean, I had a question on that, right?

[00:15:30] Because see, I come from the B2B software world, right?

[00:15:34] Where it's, you figure there's a problem and then you build up very shitty and maybe, right?

[00:15:40] And then you iterate on top of that.

[00:15:42] And, you know, that's how product development basically happens.

[00:15:45] Right.

[00:15:45] You understand your customer and so on and so forth.

[00:15:47] But with you guys, the cost of iterations, first of all, is really, you know, expensive.

[00:15:53] Right.

[00:15:54] Because it's not a bits and bytes thing.

[00:15:56] It's like real stuff, right?

[00:15:58] Atoms and molecules, let's say.

[00:16:00] Right.

[00:16:00] And then you'll have very limited customers per se, right?

[00:16:04] I mean, it has to go through the government perhaps and maybe like foreign entries and so on.

[00:16:09] So, how does the whole decision making on the product portfolio happen?

[00:16:13] Like how do you figure like what to build before you start printing it?

[00:16:16] So, I'm going to give you the business side of the answer and then he's going to give you the tech side of the answer because that just works well.

[00:16:21] So, from a business perspective, I think certain products that we've built so far have been products where we knew that there was no market in India.

[00:16:30] But yet we built it.

[00:16:32] Right.

[00:16:33] And there have been certain products that we built.

[00:16:34] Where did the conviction come from?

[00:16:36] I think that conviction comes from, you know, the knowledge that we have, you know, and the knowledge that we had at that point in time as to how good or how bad the competitors were.

[00:16:50] Right.

[00:16:52] Right.

[00:16:52] For example, let me give you the classic example.

[00:16:54] Right.

[00:16:55] The forces went in for a certain battle rifle.

[00:16:59] We knew that battle rifle very, very well.

[00:17:01] I mean, it's not a rifle which anybody else might find very difficult to make.

[00:17:07] Right.

[00:17:08] Yes.

[00:17:08] It's a very good rifle.

[00:17:09] Let's face it.

[00:17:09] It's a good rifle, but it's been there for donkey's years.

[00:17:12] Right.

[00:17:14] We knew for a matter of fact that there were certain shortcomings of that particular rifle.

[00:17:18] We also knew how that rifle could be built on our own.

[00:17:22] We also wanted to add certain, you know, certain features into that rifle, which were very unique.

[00:17:28] Right.

[00:17:29] And I don't believe that some of those are there in the hands of any OEM that's operating in India.

[00:17:35] Right.

[00:17:35] So it was a very clear conviction that fine, there will be a market if the product is good.

[00:17:40] Right.

[00:17:41] And then there are certain products, for example, the sniper that you see in here, that was a product which was clearly geared towards the user here in India, because there was a requirement that the Indian armed forces had for a sniper rifle.

[00:17:52] And we knew how exactly the sniper rifles performance would be judged.

[00:17:56] And we went back to the drawing board, you know, wanting to, you know, get to those thresholds.

[00:18:01] So the sniper was one of those classic instances where we knew that there was a requirement.

[00:18:05] There was a demand that we knew what the performance parameters were.

[00:18:08] Right.

[00:18:08] As far as the other battle rifle was concerned, it was really about the conviction that we had that we could build something which was much better and which would be appreciated.

[00:18:16] Right.

[00:18:17] You know, come what may.

[00:18:19] And that's a fact.

[00:18:21] So in other words, what you're saying is the requirements are pretty standard and the competition is, let's say, limited.

[00:18:27] So you kind of had a direction in which you could go.

[00:18:29] But then I mean, what I hear is even though like when you talk about army, right?

[00:18:34] I mean, even the calibers are not standard, right?

[00:18:35] I mean, they're using like many different types and so on.

[00:18:38] So what are the nuances of then like having decided that, you know, we're going to build that Soviet things, right?

[00:18:45] Let's say the sniper rifle or perhaps, you know, a version on the AKs and so on.

[00:18:51] Like how do you actually go and build it?

[00:18:53] There's no single caliber.

[00:18:56] Weapons are built, they're like horses for courses.

[00:18:59] You might need a donkey to do heavy lifting.

[00:19:02] You might need something swift.

[00:19:04] So there are multiple calibers.

[00:19:07] And, you know, use 9x19s for close combat, room intervention, 556 for CQB, short battle rifles.

[00:19:17] Then longer barrel ones for, you know, using into DMR operations.

[00:19:23] 7.6 to 39, the Russian standards for another requirement, you know, more stopping power close quarter.

[00:19:29] Then you have the 7.6 to 51 that can be a battle rifle.

[00:19:34] Again, fairly unwieldy at certain times.

[00:19:37] So as a DMR, yes, it's a good weapon, but coming into, you know, an assault rule or, you know, more into an urban combat areas, it would not perform that well.

[00:19:49] So each one has been modeled on a particular requirement.

[00:19:54] Each caliber has been thought out.

[00:19:55] Now, and the procurement cycle will ask for certain calibers to be sent for testing before procurement.

[00:20:03] So we have to build it according to a requirement.

[00:20:05] But we've not done any, you know, genuinely original development of an India round.

[00:20:11] We've not done it.

[00:20:13] America follows a philosophy.

[00:20:15] We follow that.

[00:20:16] Russia follows a philosophy.

[00:20:17] You follow that.

[00:20:19] Sometimes guys on the ground will say this is better.

[00:20:22] You follow that.

[00:20:23] But in, in, in genuine requirement, we've not actually progressed on working on our own rounds.

[00:20:31] Wait.

[00:20:32] So, so let me come back to the second part of this question.

[00:20:36] The Indian mutiny that happened after that, there was a clear legacy from the British to take away all manufacturing capacity in India, especially in Bepid.

[00:20:47] So people who are doing design guns, building gallons, muskets, all of them were disbanded.

[00:20:54] All the factories that were making muskets and gallons and casting and foundries were all taken out.

[00:21:00] You don't even have documents on how they casted those big guns those days.

[00:21:04] What was the metallurgy?

[00:21:06] What kind of compositions?

[00:21:07] Nothing.

[00:21:09] It just, they just made sure that.

[00:21:10] And then they brought the gun control laws into India, which kind of took away the right to own arms from everybody.

[00:21:17] I mean, other than some small six, but everybody else is out.

[00:21:20] So that legacy was gone.

[00:21:23] Otherwise there was no, I mean, calibers that India builds.

[00:21:26] I mean, you can see guns that are 18 feet long and built out of metallurgy that is unreal.

[00:21:33] It's not cracked even today.

[00:21:34] Yeah.

[00:21:34] So there are systems like that and they would fire shells up to five kilometers.

[00:21:39] Cannonballs have traveled.

[00:21:41] I think if you go into Ahmed Dagar and Avrangabad forts, you have guns that can send in cannonballs up to five kilometers.

[00:21:51] And nobody even understands how we did it.

[00:21:55] So we, our procurement process today is what is dictated by what is running on companies that have built legacy systems for over 500 years.

[00:22:04] We're five years old, sixth year.

[00:22:06] Correct?

[00:22:07] Yeah.

[00:22:07] So we have to follow.

[00:22:09] And there's no inherent policy to look at an India caliber round.

[00:22:17] There have been studies.

[00:22:18] I mean, we've seen all the 556s, 762s, but there have been some phenomenal studies that also gave you certain calibers that had more power, more velocity, more travel distance rounds, but was never incorporated.

[00:22:32] In fact, one of the best rounds ever, ever thought was a, was a 6mm round.

[00:22:38] It was probably 6x49 or 6x50, which had the best striking power of any round in the world.

[00:22:45] But for some reasons, nobody pursued it.

[00:22:47] But in all ballistic characteristics and everything else, that was the benchmark of a round.

[00:22:54] It stayed flat, traveled longer and had more impact on heating.

[00:22:59] But for various reasons, it was not pursued.

[00:23:02] So today, our procurement has just been part tech and part business that government issues.

[00:23:08] And we follow.

[00:23:10] Right.

[00:23:11] So, at some point in time, what we'd like to do, the reason why we are indigenous, the reason why we've got both small arms and ammunition under the same umbrella, is also for this reason that at some point in time, I don't know when, but at some point in time, we could be the ones doing what, let's say, all the best companies outside of India, in the US, Russia, in the Balkans have been doing for the last four decades, which is, you know, be the first port of call for the armed forces.

[00:23:38] As it meant those guys require innovation.

[00:23:40] Right. Because even in the armed space, people kind of look at the armed space and then say, fine, this is like a mini, you know, this is not, this is not like rocket science.

[00:23:50] Right. You know, the thing about weapons is this.

[00:23:53] It's not about getting one weapon right.

[00:23:55] It's about getting weapon right after right after right.

[00:23:58] Production becomes very important.

[00:24:00] Process becomes very important in here.

[00:24:03] Right.

[00:24:03] It's not like you're sending something off and then that's going to land up in some place, you know, and then it's going to land up in some place.

[00:24:09] And never going to come back.

[00:24:10] This is, this is something where after the first round is fired, you got to have the second round and the third round, semi automatic, automatic and so on and so forth.

[00:24:17] So it's a weapon that needs to be precise.

[00:24:20] It needs to be reliable.

[00:24:21] It needs to be rugged.

[00:24:23] Right. So building a weapon, even some of the most advanced countries have not managed to do.

[00:24:29] So I think our objective is to be as innovative as possible when it comes to the area of small arms and ammunition, all the way from small caliber to medium caliber in the course of time.

[00:24:38] Our objective would be to be at the frontier of, you know, of innovation in the sense that what people would like to do in the course of time is at the energy bucket, at the sensor bucket, at the ballistics bucket and the weapon together in one umbrella.

[00:24:55] Right. So that's, that's where I believe our future is heading towards.

[00:25:01] It's not purely about making a gun. Right. So if you see in the course of the last three years, whilst many people will be very happy to just, you know, make one gun and then just be, you know, fine with it.

[00:25:11] In fact, you have companies in the US which have made nothing but pistons.

[00:25:15] We've not stopped at making a sniper rifle. We went from a sniper rifle of one caliber to the other caliber, which was a beast of a caliber, the 0.33 Lapua Magnum, one that you see there.

[00:25:25] I guess about six countries have it closely. Right. And then we went from there on to a close quarter battle carbine.

[00:25:31] We went from a CQB to an assault rifle, from an assault rifle to a full blown battle rifle on the Russian is also the NATO calibers.

[00:25:38] Then we moved on to a submachine gun and now onto a pistol and hopefully soon enough onto machine gun as well. Light machine guns. Yeah, we do.

[00:25:45] So the idea is not to be constrained. Right. We've been constrained for too long. And that's one of the points I go back to.

[00:25:51] It would be easier for us to just assemble, but it would also be easier for me to just take instructions. Right.

[00:25:57] Do I want to be the person taking instructions? Did the software industry in India or for that matter, any industry which is done well in India do well because it took instructions?

[00:26:08] You mentioned procurement a few different times. Right. And I guess that's a whole other discussion.

[00:26:13] I mean, we can have, but you know, when it comes to procurement, the defense, especially right.

[00:26:20] I mean, it is just like is mired in this entire mystery. Right.

[00:26:24] Like in terms of how these arms are procured and who does this and so on and so forth.

[00:26:28] And from a lay person's perspective, right. I mean, this is right for, you know, inefficiencies, corruption, so on and so forth.

[00:26:36] I mean, in fact, I think the first proper scam that happened in independent India was the Jeep scam. Right.

[00:26:41] Way back then. Yeah. Right.

[00:26:44] So when you think about procurement, you think about like all of these different lobbies, right.

[00:26:49] Your babu is, you know, in Delhi and so on and so forth.

[00:26:52] Some mystery rooms where people get together and decide, let's import X or Y things and done. Right.

[00:27:00] Although, I mean, I feel like in recent time, I mean, they've tried to make it a lot more transparent, et cetera. Right.

[00:27:06] How do we break up that whole lobbying system of procurement and like make it as transparent as, you know, the way in it, perhaps an MNC procures, um, there's for its office.

[00:27:17] Understand this. We're not talking about shampoos and tappers here, right.

[00:27:21] We're talking about equipment, which is at times highly controlled equipment, which is not supposed to be falling into everybody's hands.

[00:27:29] So the government's role in procurement and government's role in regulation is always going to be there. And this is uniform across the world. Number one.

[00:27:36] The second one is that over the course of the last seven years, the institutionalization of defense acquisition procedure has been substantially good when it comes to transparency, when it comes to being able to offer a roadmap. Right.

[00:27:51] Number three, the process of defense procurement in India is also outside of India and seven countries is at times very random at times, very, very, very, you know, frustrating. Right.

[00:28:06] So I think we have both, right. In our country, you can also have some very quick procurements and very good procurements, which have happened.

[00:28:15] You can also have procurements, which are wired in controversy may not be for corruption, but simply because the fact that it's taken too long. Right. Right.

[00:28:23] Just to kind of finish off and fatigue is set. So I think this whole idea of defense procurements being easy should be taken out. Right.

[00:28:32] So I think this whole idea of companies, right, companies which have to be operating in the defense space. And now I'm kind of looking at your customer audience as well and saying customers, you know, the customer is always going to be, you know, one customer, maybe a few customers. Right.

[00:28:47] If I add in law enforcement. So that customer is not going to be fast. That customer is always going to be pacing, you know, themselves.

[00:28:56] So having that ability to stay on the pitch is very important. Right. You might have the best possible product in this world, but you still need to be dead in the pitch. One.

[00:29:06] Second, something that me and Dinesh have emphasized in the course of the last five, ten minutes is this innovation means not just purely about getting that one product right, because you can be a one trick pony and very quickly be dead. Right.

[00:29:19] So for us, innovation is really about taking the lessons that we've done this as quickly as possible. Right. You know, ScoutWorks, I think you should talk about ScoutWorks idea.

[00:29:30] So let me put it before he goes there. Right. This is the only field that I need to kill somebody. You understand this? Right.

[00:29:38] Like, it's not like somebody getting a toothbrush, clean your teeth, have a shampoo. No. Pull the trigger, the damn thing has to fire.

[00:29:46] So reliability, reliability and reliability everywhere. Right. You build a car, it doesn't work. You park it away, you get out.

[00:29:52] But the closest I've seen coming to what we do when you pull the trigger, it's a life experience.

[00:30:00] Nobody realized when kids hear, they've all grown up thinking it just happens.

[00:30:04] But he didn't touch a gun the first time he saw it. He wouldn't touch it. He was petrified. He stood away from it.

[00:30:11] He thought like, you know, what I catch a snake. No, we didn't touch it because it's a life experience.

[00:30:17] You pull the trigger. Right. There's a sequence of things that happened that you don't understand.

[00:30:22] And then you hear a bike, you know, all in a microsecond. But, you know, these are a few things that you've never grown up doing.

[00:30:30] You've started a vehicle, you know how it runs. This is something nobody does.

[00:30:34] I'm going to interrupt you. He's a Kurgi. These guys get to fire more often than people like us.

[00:30:39] He was not scared of the gun. I was scared of the gun.

[00:30:41] So it's something that people need to understand that if it doesn't fire, that's the end of you.

[00:30:52] So, and you're putting this into somebody else's arms, the soldier at the front line.

[00:30:58] And you're the ones whose your technology is backing that it will work every time, time and time after again.

[00:31:05] So, it's very different commitments that are needed here. You make candies, how of them go wrong, it's fine.

[00:31:13] Nobody's going to come back to question, but you kill a man because you made a faulty gun.

[00:31:17] It's not accepted. So, from the perspective of what a weapon does to how it's designed, to how it's engineered,

[00:31:26] how it's manufactured is an entirely different mindset. It's nowhere near what any other product does.

[00:31:32] The closest I can come to this comparison is an aeroplane. When you build something, even a small thing like I put a radio antenna,

[00:31:41] I can give you real time experiences on it. We fitted in the first stack in on a bird called the T38 Talit.

[00:31:52] Slightly offset over the air intake because that was the only space it had.

[00:31:56] And then that little antenna, about 120-130mm by 50mm antenna, that was just a radio beacon antenna,

[00:32:07] created a flutter on because of the vortices there. And the guy went into a tailspin.

[00:32:14] Wow.

[00:32:16] Without knowing what and how to control it. So, luckily, he managed to get control, landed the bird.

[00:32:22] But things like that can happen. Small corrections, small things that go into design.

[00:32:28] So, you're walking into the unknown at times. You know, you do all the design in your head.

[00:32:33] You put it on a computer. You do analysis. But till the connections happen, the spring releases,

[00:32:38] the firing pin and that strikes the primer. The primer ignites. Anvil collapses and powder ignites, right?

[00:32:45] You never know what's happening. All of that in some surreal space.

[00:32:49] So, it's a different industry. It's a different mindset here on what happens.

[00:32:56] I also think we should talk about the way that we organize things so that we are able to kind of not, you know,

[00:33:02] get constrained by our own sort of lethargy.

[00:33:06] So, we kind of had something very similar to what Lockheed Martin had way back when they were trying to develop the Stealth program.

[00:33:11] They had what is called the Stark Works kind of program. So, we had a very Stark Works kind of a team.

[00:33:16] Guys were very nimble. Guys would kind of come in, go out.

[00:33:20] Guys can bring in certain kind of expertise, right?

[00:33:24] Guys who could do very good execution, right?

[00:33:27] And not be constrained at any point in time by their prior experience.

[00:33:31] So, we didn't have gun manufacturing expertise at all.

[00:33:35] We didn't have any gun designer run up. We just had good mechanical engineers, metallurgical engineers.

[00:33:39] Guys who are problem solving guys, right? We've had persons who were 65-70 years of age, retired folks,

[00:33:45] very good tool makers come in there, solve problems and walk away, right?

[00:33:49] So, that is what also helped us because we were not constrained by the organization culture, right?

[00:33:54] We were not constrained by what we thought.

[00:33:58] So, you were able to apply a lot of first principles thinking on like building in this space.

[00:34:04] We didn't build a rigid organization. You needed design to be worked.

[00:34:09] You had a design team working on it. You needed, let's say, mechanical design team working on it.

[00:34:13] You need problem solving there. That team was working.

[00:34:16] You need analysis on, you know, how to control pressure, what kind of heat was coming, what kind of sending.

[00:34:22] Then you had analysis teams working. So, we did not make it a very heavy kind of industry.

[00:34:27] We kept it agile. It's like having a million strong army.

[00:34:30] But when you look at the special forces, they build a few thousand guys.

[00:34:33] Right.

[00:34:34] But they get used to applications. So, it's like a team of different special forces working on, you know,

[00:34:40] Marine guys working on, Marine Air Force guys on their field, land guys.

[00:34:44] So, like that, agile teams worked on multiple components and then they managed to build what it took.

[00:34:51] So, all the programs from different teams do not held into a weapons system.

[00:34:57] Right. Yeah.

[00:34:58] So, you know, when you think about the US, right?

[00:35:01] Obviously, I mean, there's this term, the military industrial complex and the state there is, you know,

[00:35:08] very deeply embedded with the, you know, the Lockheeds or the Boeings and so on and so forth.

[00:35:12] Right. And, you know, product life cycles with, you know, in defense per se.

[00:35:17] It can't be so agile that, you know, someone comes and says that, hey, I need these 70,000 rifles.

[00:35:22] And then you'll be like, okay, all right, we'll see you in six months type of it.

[00:35:25] So, the government has to kind of keep you in the loop or the army has to keep you in the loop in terms of like where they're headed,

[00:35:31] what could be the need maybe like four years from now, five years from now and so on and so forth.

[00:35:36] Do you think like we're at that space right now where the government kind of keeps you guys in the loop?

[00:35:42] We don't know what.

[00:35:43] They do keep us in the loop. It's regarding what's coming out.

[00:35:46] They do tell us about the programs that they want to do.

[00:35:48] Okay.

[00:35:48] But then where I've always differ and I differ even more at this point in time.

[00:35:55] And I'll tell you the reason why we would differ at this point in time.

[00:35:58] We differ at this point in time because we've seen how a lot of the rest of the world actually does modernization, right?

[00:36:05] They don't look at modernization as one big bang procurement, right?

[00:36:09] For example, the Next Generation Squad Weapons Program of the United States Army.

[00:36:13] And we've worked very closely with some people who've been part of that.

[00:36:15] We're not allowed to get into that, but we get a third-person view of that.

[00:36:19] Now, the way that those guys organized the program was about buying 500,000 guns.

[00:36:24] They knew that was a unicorn, an impossible thing to do in one go.

[00:36:27] But what they did was they said, okay, fine, this is the Marines, this is the Special Forces.

[00:36:31] These are the guys who will kind of actually end up trialing your weapons.

[00:36:35] This is the caliber that you guys have to work on.

[00:36:37] These are the performance parameters.

[00:36:38] Go out there and figure out your best designs.

[00:36:40] Come back to us.

[00:36:41] We will evaluate the designs.

[00:36:42] Designs work.

[00:36:43] I'll give you the contract to go out and manufacture certain limited series production rifles.

[00:36:47] We'll go back, we'll test them to the shape.

[00:36:49] We'll give you the feedback.

[00:36:50] If the feedback is good, we'll try and push you, right?

[00:36:53] Someone's going to win this particular contract, but that doesn't mean that the number two is going to lose

[00:36:56] because we'll try and still push them into other markets.

[00:36:58] If it's not the Marines who will buy it, maybe somebody else might buy it.

[00:37:02] If those guys don't buy it, the international NATO forces will buy it, right?

[00:37:06] So it's not a big bank procurement, right?

[00:37:08] Now, I always believe that we in India, especially with regard to small arms,

[00:37:15] people who might be operating in other areas of defense might have different viewpoint as well.

[00:37:20] Small arms, you know, in my view has generally been something where the force is trying to do big bang.

[00:37:30] Right?

[00:37:30] Now, I'm not stating that's bad.

[00:37:32] To this day, I will not state that whatever they're trying to do is bad.

[00:37:36] I'm just trying to put forward this opinion here that big bang and the nimble approach, right?

[00:37:44] Can go side by side.

[00:37:46] Now, what happens with the big bang?

[00:37:47] I'll tell you what happens with the big bang is everybody wants to have a slice of that,

[00:37:51] which is why you would see all in sundry, you know, guys sitting in Israel, Russia,

[00:37:55] etc. trying to sign up on joint ventures, technology transfers and so on and so forth on paper.

[00:38:01] Are they really going to be giving you the why?

[00:38:03] This is my question.

[00:38:04] They would never give you the why.

[00:38:05] And what happens when you have to, you know, ramp a production, let's say in times of war, right?

[00:38:11] Are you going to have the why in your hands?

[00:38:13] No, because you'll still be dependent upon the original OEM for certain parts.

[00:38:16] Right?

[00:38:17] Next question.

[00:38:18] Is it good to have your why?

[00:38:20] Yes, it's super important to have your why because you don't necessarily have to be at the mercy of one single,

[00:38:27] you know,

[00:38:27] you can be, you know, in years where the Indian army is not going to be buying much.

[00:38:31] The Indian police may not be buying much.

[00:38:33] I might have five armed forces across the world filling up that particular, you know, order volume,

[00:38:39] which means that my business is more stable because I've got a larger pool of customers to play around in.

[00:38:44] From a technology development perspective, the guys who have been given a TOT are least likely to actually invest money in R&D.

[00:38:53] Guys like us would actually invest close to what, 10 to 15% of R&D at this point in time.

[00:38:59] Right?

[00:38:59] We end up doing more failures, which also means tomorrow I become a sort of a, you know, a weapon in the hands of our own governments when it comes to foreign relations.

[00:39:10] Right?

[00:39:11] I would love to have a time in the future where the Indian army, the Indian government, the Indian bureaucracy, the politicians, who's over it is.

[00:39:20] Right?

[00:39:20] Stand up and then say, fine, you know what, that country there, we need to build up a relationship with those guys.

[00:39:25] I know they have a requirement for defense equipment, small arms, ammunition, etc.

[00:39:29] This is the way we kind of have diplomacy with those guys.

[00:39:32] Right?

[00:39:33] It's not like we, you know, we say fine, we are good friends because the world has changed substantially.

[00:39:39] The idea of friendship, right?

[00:39:45] So, that's right.

[00:39:46] That's right.

[00:39:49] That's right.

[00:39:49] That's right.

[00:39:49] That's right.

[00:39:49] Geopolitics is different today.

[00:39:50] So, a simple thing is, you can have a GV.

[00:39:55] The partner will send you some drawings, you manufacture according to the drawings.

[00:39:59] He will never give you any technology that would involve, you know, the mechanical aspect of the, you know, the trigger sequencing or the treasure parts.

[00:40:10] They would invariably pack it and send it.

[00:40:12] It's fine.

[00:40:12] I mean, as business makes sense, you don't have to invest on your own R&D.

[00:40:17] You don't have to test, proof the part, nothing.

[00:40:19] You just get it, drop it, fit into what is given as a bill to print, right?

[00:40:25] That works fine when we are not at war.

[00:40:28] Works fine when we are at peace.

[00:40:29] You can wait for the consignment to come, FedEx it to you and or DHL will deliver.

[00:40:35] Then you put it into play or a container will come on a ship and you can do it.

[00:40:38] But what happens when you are denied?

[00:40:41] Sea routes.

[00:40:42] You have a no-fly zone put up over your country.

[00:40:44] Who is going to build those parts?

[00:40:46] That point.

[00:40:47] Critical security aspect.

[00:40:49] Nobody thinks about it.

[00:40:50] If they just put out a blockade on the sea and a no-fly zone, then nothing comes in.

[00:40:56] You can, I mean, Serbia had the situation.

[00:40:58] They had a no-fly zone, 80 kilometers around the whole of Serbia.

[00:41:03] So, they couldn't get anything.

[00:41:06] So, finally, I think one of the reasons they broke down as a, with having fantastic industries was they couldn't get raw material in.

[00:41:15] That's where the crocs came into that they signed up to whatever negotiated settlements because they did not.

[00:41:23] The only reason Ukraine is surviving today is because there are 22 countries feeding it.

[00:41:30] But on their own, they would have broken down a long time ago.

[00:41:33] Right.

[00:41:33] This thing would have ended 18 months ago.

[00:41:35] But it continues because there is a supply chain that's managed.

[00:41:39] So, managing your supply chain is very, very critical.

[00:41:42] Especially in military space.

[00:41:44] You might not, you might say that, okay, I'm getting a gold plated weapon today, which the US Army is using.

[00:41:50] And then your weapon is not gold plated.

[00:41:52] You might just be a little below standard, but the gold plated one won't come to you when you need it at the crux of the moment.

[00:41:59] So, you need to have your own systems match up.

[00:42:01] You need to build your own industry effort and engineering to take it forward.

[00:42:08] So, from an outsider's perspective, right, one thing that seems bizarre to me is that we have innumerable engineers here, perhaps more than any other country in the world, barring, let's say China.

[00:42:20] Right.

[00:42:20] And yet, forget about like very sophisticated armaments and weapons and so on and so forth.

[00:42:27] Right.

[00:42:27] I mean, we import helmets.

[00:42:29] We import like certain, like, let's say certain types of ladders or whatever.

[00:42:34] Right.

[00:42:34] I mean, it strikes me as bizarre.

[00:42:38] But also, I mean, we skipped that whole manufacturing curve.

[00:42:42] Right.

[00:42:42] I mean, we just recuvented the services.

[00:42:44] So, do you feel like, you know, we don't have that manufacturing culture?

[00:42:48] I mean, like in terms of producing like really high quality, super precise, like fail proof kind of equipment.

[00:42:57] We're not there yet because of that, because of the fact that we don't have a precedence.

[00:43:01] So, the two kinds of engineering here, again, you come back to the same thing.

[00:43:05] There are engineers.

[00:43:06] There are applied engineers.

[00:43:08] Guys who really apply.

[00:43:10] An engineer can just get to a job and go home.

[00:43:12] That's a different story.

[00:43:13] Heck, I'm an engineer.

[00:43:14] Yeah.

[00:43:15] Not as a company, even in the private industry.

[00:43:16] I mean, what is a guy sitting in a call center and telling you that, you know, plug that cable in?

[00:43:22] It's not an applied engineer.

[00:43:23] It's just an engineer.

[00:43:24] I qualifies him to be an electrical guy.

[00:43:26] I won't tell you that's 220, not 110, stick it in.

[00:43:29] You know, at the end of the day, that's all it happens.

[00:43:32] But see, you talked about helmets.

[00:43:34] Now, coming back to the helmets, right?

[00:43:36] We manufacture helmets today.

[00:43:38] But Kevlar, where does it come from?

[00:43:40] We don't make Kevlar in India.

[00:43:42] Kevlar has to come in from dough.

[00:43:44] It's proprietary dough.

[00:43:46] So, if dough stops the supply of Kevlar, you don't have helmets.

[00:43:50] And you've not worked an alternative to it.

[00:43:52] Right?

[00:43:53] You'd never develop an industry because Kevlar is available now in times we can import it.

[00:43:58] We do it.

[00:43:58] What do we do?

[00:43:59] We take it.

[00:44:00] We do a layup on tapes and filament.

[00:44:02] And then we put it into a mold, bake it and call it an India made helmet.

[00:44:06] And that's what we're doing.

[00:44:07] But the basic fiber of what is coming into it is not ours.

[00:44:13] The basic XLP, again, we'll have to call Hannibal and ask them to give it to us because nobody else will give you the plastic.

[00:44:19] So, each one of these things, right?

[00:44:21] On the surface, you can say, yes, made in India, XYZ.

[00:44:24] But do you really make it?

[00:44:27] Or tomorrow if you are on...

[00:44:29] Ultimately, it's how you work in denied space.

[00:44:30] So, when you build something, right?

[00:44:33] You should be able to procure your stuff in India and build it from our stock.

[00:44:40] Which might not be the most, you know, perfect thing.

[00:44:44] Might hit an 80% markup.

[00:44:47] But you still have an 80% markup.

[00:44:49] So, how do we make our supply chains a little more robust, right?

[00:44:52] I mean, if you're saying that a particular instrument or weapon or equipment requires, you know, parts from 200 or 400 different places, right?

[00:45:03] And some of these may be geopolitically constrained.

[00:45:07] How do we build that supply chain?

[00:45:10] How do we make it more robust?

[00:45:11] So, that's what I said.

[00:45:12] So, you need to understand what do you have as capacity.

[00:45:15] You need to understand what you have as capability.

[00:45:17] And then work on that and then refine it.

[00:45:19] Like, for example, you look at it.

[00:45:21] We don't have been...

[00:45:22] Okay, earlier maybe we did not have uranium in the Indian nuclear program.

[00:45:25] So, we signed all kinds of E2Z deals with everybody on nuclear non-proliferation.

[00:45:32] With the US government on nuclear fuels.

[00:45:35] Things like that.

[00:45:36] But then there was always a program running parallelly, working on thorium.

[00:45:40] Thorium was available.

[00:45:41] Like that, it's 60% energy calorific value of uranium.

[00:45:48] But you continued processing it.

[00:45:49] You would build a bigger reactor, but you built a reactor.

[00:45:52] Right?

[00:45:53] With the uranium 238 isotope.

[00:45:56] I might build a reactor that's 20 meter dire.

[00:45:59] With thorium, I might have to build it two times bigger.

[00:46:01] But I have power.

[00:46:03] I'm not waiting for somebody.

[00:46:05] I'm not...

[00:46:05] So, that's the way you need to...

[00:46:07] So, you have a certain kind of steel available.

[00:46:09] You have a certain kind of aluminum available.

[00:46:12] You've got to work with those strengths.

[00:46:14] You can't expect somebody from Germany to send you the steel.

[00:46:17] I hate to call it, but Jugar.

[00:46:19] No, not Jugar.

[00:46:20] Pure science.

[00:46:21] There is no Jugar.

[00:46:22] Zero Jugar.

[00:46:23] Let's say...

[00:46:24] So, let me...

[00:46:25] You go back to the density of the steel you have locally available.

[00:46:28] We have a lot of sulfur content.

[00:46:31] Hmm.

[00:46:32] Now, how do you process it in smelting to remove it?

[00:46:38] And arrive to the minimum.

[00:46:39] What's your carbon content?

[00:46:41] How much percentage?

[00:46:42] How can you add more?

[00:46:43] When you go into metallurgy.

[00:46:45] And come back to the fact that...

[00:46:46] Okay.

[00:46:47] There's an American gun.

[00:46:48] Which is using some exotic steel coming in from Germany or some other place.

[00:46:52] Filing 10,000 rounds.

[00:46:54] Right?

[00:46:54] And I have an Indian steel.

[00:46:55] I have a steel that comes in locally.

[00:46:58] And I might file 9,000.

[00:47:00] Right?

[00:47:01] But I'm not waiting for some mill out of Detroit to send me the steel.

[00:47:06] I have a mill that is 300 kilometers from here.

[00:47:08] That can send me the steel.

[00:47:10] So, that is what they should be looking at.

[00:47:13] What can be localized without...

[00:47:15] Depending on a supply chain that is exotic.

[00:47:17] So, you know, we talk about so many things about, you know, localizing stuff.

[00:47:23] But you need to also understand the strengths of localizing.

[00:47:27] Right?

[00:47:28] China builds helicopter undercarriages which don't even serve 30% of what the equivalent would serve in another country.

[00:47:35] But they change it after 30 and put a new one.

[00:47:37] And they have a full fleet running 24-7.

[00:47:40] We have one of them now.

[00:47:40] We take six weeks for the pot to come in.

[00:47:43] Sometimes six months.

[00:47:44] So, we pull out from another one.

[00:47:45] Fit it to this.

[00:47:46] So, then you have two sitting down on the ground.

[00:47:49] So, you got to manage supply chain better.

[00:47:52] You got to understand the strengths.

[00:47:54] Build on your strengths.

[00:47:55] Build on your capabilities.

[00:47:57] And build on what you have.

[00:47:58] Then coming back to the supply chain part.

[00:48:00] It's a very interesting story that we have.

[00:48:03] Now, he is mentioning Serbia.

[00:48:05] So, this was a country that was pretty much destroyed by the...

[00:48:09] Yeah, what's the story there?

[00:48:10] I mean, how did those guys figure this stuff out fast?

[00:48:14] Now, I say this is the interesting part of it.

[00:48:16] We always look at stuff as being, you know, cutting edge.

[00:48:21] For the most part, you have to understand it's not about cutting edge.

[00:48:24] It's really about how badly you are against a wall that dictates the way in which you...

[00:48:30] Your resilience power basically comes back in.

[00:48:33] I'm talking English here, but we've seen that in the...

[00:48:36] In the way those guys take pride in calling the weapon a weapon of the wrong.

[00:48:40] Right?

[00:48:41] They were pushed against a wall.

[00:48:42] The war basically came and destroyed whatever they had as infrastructure.

[00:48:46] The professors, students got into work on the roads, rebuilding the roads, getting the electricity lines back in there.

[00:48:53] The machinery was taken back, right?

[00:48:56] Because they bombed pretty much all of the defense equipment.

[00:48:59] These guys went back in there, started making their own equipment, right?

[00:49:02] Whatever they could kind of assemble.

[00:49:04] To this day, a lot of those factories are not, you know, gold-plated factories.

[00:49:08] Not the most beautiful factories.

[00:49:10] They don't have the most beautiful floors.

[00:49:11] They don't have the most beautiful looking equipment.

[00:49:13] But they do a job and they do a bloody good job.

[00:49:17] Right?

[00:49:17] And what they did not have in terms of, you know, having access to the most recent CNC machines,

[00:49:23] and so on and so forth, they managed to do or cover up by focusing on stuff we should be very good at.

[00:49:29] Which is the process.

[00:49:31] So they defined the process and got better.

[00:49:33] What we're trying to do at least in our system, for example, let me just take the case of this particular rifle.

[00:49:38] The first build of this particular rifle had to be done with no data that we had on a barrel.

[00:49:45] Right?

[00:49:45] Sorry, on a?

[00:49:46] On a barrel.

[00:49:47] Right?

[00:49:47] Absolutely no data that we had on a barrel.

[00:49:49] The first build of this particular sniper rifle was done with no data on a barrel.

[00:49:54] Right?

[00:49:55] So the first lot of weapons, maybe the first three or four weapons that we did, we actually imported the barrels.

[00:50:02] We had to do so.

[00:50:03] Now would the government of India or the Indian Armed Forces at that point in time come back in and say no, no, no, we don't have a barrel.

[00:50:09] Right?

[00:50:10] I've had people say that.

[00:50:11] But you know, at that point in time, my heart just basically cried and said, listen, hardware development takes time.

[00:50:18] Takes time.

[00:50:19] You have to depend upon some source to build up the basic footprint.

[00:50:23] So that barrel basically became the benchmark on which we picked the rest of the rifle.

[00:50:27] Now that we built the rest of the rifle, we know that this is the only element that we need to control.

[00:50:33] Right?

[00:50:34] And the other element that we had to control was the ammunition.

[00:50:37] Right?

[00:50:37] So now we set up our own ammunition plant.

[00:50:39] It's much easier for us to kind of control even the ammunition.

[00:50:42] Now we have a barrel cell, which means to say we can manufacture even the barrel.

[00:50:45] We're moving five steps ahead in the last one year in the sense that today we are experimenting with multiple variations of raw material on the barrel.

[00:50:55] Multiple designs of the barrel.

[00:50:57] Right?

[00:50:58] What used to constrain us as far as weapon built earlier was a barrel.

[00:51:01] So now that it doesn't constrain us, we kind of changing so many things for the rest of the systems so that we were able to optimize upon our own barrels today.

[00:51:08] Right?

[00:51:08] Tomorrow somebody comes across and says, I need a special forces weapon which is super light.

[00:51:12] Right?

[00:51:12] We would actually be able to give them a weapon which is partly carbon fiber, partly aerospace aluminum or you know, a barrel wrapped with carbon fiber which has absolutely no change as far as accuracy or point of impact shift is concerned.

[00:51:28] Right?

[00:51:29] Something which can basically be used in the kind of environments that we have just to say desert, cold, swampy weather and extreme humidity.

[00:51:38] Right?

[00:51:38] But that takes time.

[00:51:40] So the only option I can tell you is this, there is no shortcut in the area of defense.

[00:51:46] It takes time.

[00:51:48] Right?

[00:51:48] Right.

[00:51:49] And there is no country that I have seen so far that manages to get a transfer of technology.

[00:51:55] And suddenly, because-

[00:51:57] Why would they, right?

[00:51:57] I mean, why would like France or like the US or anyone else?

[00:52:01] They give us a transfer of technology.

[00:52:02] Why do we need today?

[00:52:03] Now that we have it, why would we today?

[00:52:05] We don't.

[00:52:06] I wouldn't do so.

[00:52:07] I wouldn't do so.

[00:52:07] I would be, I mean, in fact, we've had instances where people outside of the country have told us, can you give us a DOT?

[00:52:12] I said, happy to do so.

[00:52:13] Yeah, but we'll send the parts to your assembly.

[00:52:16] But you know what?

[00:52:17] We would do exactly what the rest of the world does to us.

[00:52:20] Because that's, that's good business.

[00:52:23] That is also the right way to look at this.

[00:52:26] Nobody is going to be giving away the secret sauce.

[00:52:29] It's accepted.

[00:52:30] Right.

[00:52:30] Right?

[00:52:31] And if you have somebody who needs your systems and who wants a transfer of technology, it is very fair for us to also say, I don't want this technology to be kind of going into wrong hands.

[00:52:40] Yeah.

[00:52:41] So I would give you what I believe.

[00:52:44] I can control.

[00:52:45] Isn't this fair?

[00:52:47] Yeah, absolutely.

[00:52:47] Right.

[00:52:48] Yeah.

[00:52:48] Yeah.

[00:52:49] There's this, I mean, quote from the software world, which is like, your margin is my opportunity, basically.

[00:52:55] Right?

[00:52:55] And where I'm going with this is like, when we procure all of this stuff from the US or elsewhere,

[00:53:03] right?

[00:53:03] For instance, I mean, when we procure the rifles, etc.

[00:53:05] We don't get the ammo along with that.

[00:53:07] We, we barely get like, we just get the bare equipment as such.

[00:53:12] Right?

[00:53:12] So there are plenty of ancillary stuff that we can still like, I mean, we will have to go elsewhere for that.

[00:53:17] Right?

[00:53:18] Spares?

[00:53:19] Sorry?

[00:53:20] Yeah.

[00:53:21] So those, that opportunity, right?

[00:53:23] Opportunity in building, let's say, spares, ancillaries, maintenance, and so on and so forth.

[00:53:28] So you think that is like an easier wedge for someone to sort of like, get in?

[00:53:33] No.

[00:53:33] If you, if you're not in the weapon space, if you're not building weapons, you cannot be in the spare space.

[00:53:37] See, let me, let me interject something like that.

[00:53:40] Software engineers are like the soldiers.

[00:53:42] Indian army.

[00:53:43] Millions strong.

[00:53:44] Like that.

[00:53:45] You have like, Rory Bandura has 5 million.

[00:53:47] 3 million engineers, right?

[00:53:48] So you're trained, right?

[00:53:50] What if you don't have a computer?

[00:53:53] What are you going to do?

[00:53:55] This is the exact same thing you should reflect upon.

[00:53:59] Right.

[00:53:59] You can have a million standing army, but if you don't have the weapons on hand, what are

[00:54:03] you going to do?

[00:54:04] You could have trained 10 years on it.

[00:54:07] But at the given time and the given point, right, it would be exactly like a software engineer

[00:54:12] who studied in combat, but does not have access to a computer.

[00:54:15] So we are the ones who put that on the table.

[00:54:18] We are the ones who equip them to, you know, to carry on what they're trained to execute,

[00:54:23] what they have, you know, practiced over a period of time.

[00:54:27] So that's what we do.

[00:54:29] You know, the levels we build.

[00:54:31] Right.

[00:54:32] So how do you think about strategic partnerships?

[00:54:36] Because I understand, you know, you can't operate in silos, right?

[00:54:39] There is a certain ecosystem.

[00:54:40] Obviously, you mean you have to like sort of exchange information, perhaps like, you know,

[00:54:44] buy and sell, so on and so forth.

[00:54:46] Right.

[00:54:46] So when you think about strategic partnerships as such, like, are there certain categories

[00:54:51] of people you look at?

[00:54:53] How do you go about building capabilities?

[00:54:55] So when you come to strategic partnerships, if you're talking about partnerships where we kind

[00:54:59] of collaborate with outside OEMs.

[00:55:01] Yeah.

[00:55:02] Actually speaking, we don't have anything against outside OEMs.

[00:55:05] Understand this because we understand them better today than anybody else who just wants

[00:55:09] to do a JV or a TOT.

[00:55:10] We understand them better.

[00:55:11] This is mutual respect.

[00:55:13] That mutual respect in our opinion is the reason why there'd be many more OEMs who've

[00:55:16] come back to us and said, listen, I respect what you guys are doing.

[00:55:19] I would like to have a strategic partnership with you.

[00:55:22] Right.

[00:55:23] So now what is happening is we kind of attracting strategic partners, let's say on another real,

[00:55:29] right?

[00:55:29] We want to get into, let's say medium caliber.

[00:55:32] We want to get into certain other areas.

[00:55:33] Multiple caliber.

[00:55:34] We're finding more qualified strategic partners, guys who respect the fact that we've done certain

[00:55:39] things right.

[00:55:39] And those guys want to have those partnerships with us because of the fact that, you know,

[00:55:44] we actually have the ability to not just take in, we also have the ability to give back.

[00:55:49] Right.

[00:55:50] There are certain markets which they can never cover, but we can cover.

[00:55:53] Right.

[00:55:54] We can give them a new product, which is for all kind of a customer.

[00:55:58] They would never be able to do so.

[00:56:00] Expect a French company, for example, to change its manufacturing process and its way of building

[00:56:07] a rifle just because of the fact that it needs to get into an African country.

[00:56:10] It's unlikely.

[00:56:12] Right.

[00:56:13] So we are actually attracting the right kind of partners today.

[00:56:16] People who want to do venture types.

[00:56:18] We're very open to all of them because in my view and his view, as long as someone who wants to be a partner with you has the right

[00:56:26] intents and is not in there so that they can kind of, you know, slowly walk away when the time is important.

[00:56:36] Right.

[00:56:37] Our good partners.

[00:56:38] Right.

[00:56:39] Someone who enjoys working with you and is willing to kind of actually collaborate for new stuff is even better for us.

[00:56:46] Hmm.

[00:56:48] Since, uh, again, it's, you could have a partner who wants to develop a new caliber.

[00:56:53] Uh, you know, earlier we wouldn't know anything today.

[00:56:56] We, foundations are so strong that if somebody comes and says, okay, I want a particular caliber for a particular requirement,

[00:57:03] we could do it, develop it for him.

[00:57:04] Uh, he could get faster turnarounds.

[00:57:07] Our foundation is so good that tomorrow if somebody in the Indian army wakes up and says,

[00:57:11] we need a specific bullet to do, you know, this size, uh, we could build a weapon.

[00:57:17] I don't have to depend on any other country for any technology.

[00:57:21] We don't have to depend on any other country to prove a caliber.

[00:57:24] Uh, we can do both the bullets.

[00:57:26] We can do the ammunition, the size they want.

[00:57:28] We can do the weapons, the size they want.

[00:57:31] Foundations are so strong that we don't need to depend on, I don't know,

[00:57:35] you can have somebody coming in, let's say from Europe and say, I can build a gun that will do three kilometers.

[00:57:40] I'll laugh at it because I know exactly that he can't.

[00:57:42] We know we built it.

[00:57:43] We know that this caliber has this calorific value and this is what I will get.

[00:57:48] So the days of somebody coming and trying to push something down the throat,

[00:57:51] making claims that don't match up to actual engineering, I don't think works anymore.

[00:57:57] Yeah, those days are gone.

[00:57:59] Those days are gone.

[00:58:00] You know, selling brochures, somebody in Delhi coming and saying that.

[00:58:03] But again, there are people who've actually found benefit by having technology types.

[00:58:07] I would at no point in time say that those technology types are any less important.

[00:58:11] In our case, we did it differently.

[00:58:13] That doesn't mean everybody is going to be doing that.

[00:58:15] Some guys might actually find it better to have this technology types.

[00:58:18] It's about the area that you're operating in.

[00:58:20] Where we believe we've earned the right to kind of call ourselves indigenous is because of the fact that we've gone through the trials and tribulations of making not one weapon, multiple calibers.

[00:58:29] Yeah, right.

[00:58:30] Having made those weapons, having proved those weapons to certain forces and also calling ourselves indigenous because we set up the entire infrastructure.

[00:58:40] Right.

[00:58:40] And also went all the way to the raw material to the final assembly.

[00:58:44] Right. Now that is what separates an OEM from an assembler.

[00:58:49] Let me put it very simply.

[00:58:51] An assembly guy is not an OEM.

[00:58:54] He should stop calling himself an OEM and the armed forces should stop thinking that those guys are OEMs.

[00:59:00] An OEM is an OEM.

[00:59:01] Right.

[00:59:02] Kid builders, basically more sophisticated way.

[00:59:06] You can have a DIY guy.

[00:59:07] I mean, it's certainly better than like importing wholesale everything from there.

[00:59:12] But it's, it's not like manufactured by us.

[00:59:16] Yeah, it's certainly better than importing everything that I agree with you on.

[00:59:19] Yeah.

[00:59:19] But, you know, we got to, you know, when we went in software, we went from having nothing to software services and then finally went to products.

[00:59:27] Right.

[00:59:28] Yeah.

[00:59:28] Right.

[00:59:28] Productized services.

[00:59:30] Come on.

[00:59:31] I know products.

[00:59:33] I don't believe that.

[00:59:34] So the thing is, is right.

[00:59:35] There's a charm to being a product company.

[00:59:38] There's a certain value in being a product.

[00:59:39] Of course.

[00:59:40] Right.

[00:59:40] You are considered valuable because you have certain intellectual property in house.

[00:59:45] That intellectual property may not be paid in zero, but the intellectual property could really be about solving a problem.

[00:59:50] In the logistics business, that is very rare to find.

[00:59:53] So finding that inside our company is possibly one of the biggest achievements.

[00:59:58] Right.

[00:59:58] Right.

[00:59:59] Right.

[00:59:59] That is very rare to find.

[01:00:01] So what can, I mean, again, yeah.

[01:00:04] Just one.

[01:00:04] We had a guest yesterday from one of the forces.

[01:00:10] And the Indian government has imported a particular weapon with the TOD, which is transfer of technology from a foreign OEM.

[01:00:20] This guy is from another service.

[01:00:23] But the government imported this weapon for the army, ground, land forces.

[01:00:29] So this guy wants to use the same weapon on his, on his domain.

[01:00:36] And he says, the weapon is green.

[01:00:40] And it comes painted from the OEMs.

[01:00:44] Okay.

[01:00:45] So you look at it that they can't even change the color of the weapon to the requirement of this particular force in the Indian ecosystem.

[01:00:58] Because the OEM has even sent the whole thing painted in a particular color.

[01:01:03] That's crazy.

[01:01:04] With a certain material which you can't access.

[01:01:05] Which you can't access.

[01:01:06] And you can't fiddle around with the paint on top of it.

[01:01:09] A warranty goes for a toss.

[01:01:11] Crazy.

[01:01:12] And this is the same forces.

[01:01:14] It's like special forces, army, air force, navy.

[01:01:18] You can't interchange because one guy is, he can't even change the color in the weapon.

[01:01:23] Right.

[01:01:23] So I have a broader question, right?

[01:01:25] I mean the common refrain that we heard over the last 25-30 years was we're not building IP.

[01:01:30] Right?

[01:01:30] I mean software is, software services specifically.

[01:01:34] I mean we're not building anything unique.

[01:01:37] We're not building our own Google.

[01:01:38] We're not building our own, heck I mean even our Facebook or Instagram or whatever.

[01:01:42] Right?

[01:01:43] But I feel like we have the opportunity to build in manufacturing, build out an IP.

[01:01:48] I think we should be building our own stuff everywhere.

[01:01:50] Right.

[01:01:50] Right.

[01:01:50] I don't think the time is any late.

[01:01:52] So how do we do that?

[01:01:53] How do we do that?

[01:01:54] I think the whole thing boils down to, in my opinion, right?

[01:01:59] It might be very simplistic point as well.

[01:02:01] The whole thing boils down to organization culture.

[01:02:05] Right?

[01:02:06] It also boils down to how much of risk you're willing to take.

[01:02:09] Would I take the same risk when it came to making a tag?

[01:02:12] Is it building my own IP for the whole tank?

[01:02:15] I don't think we would have but somebody else might.

[01:02:18] Right?

[01:02:19] Maybe a Tata's would have taken on that particular objective and might even have succeeded.

[01:02:24] Right?

[01:02:25] Now I'm here of this view that it doesn't matter whether you are aiming for the tank.

[01:02:30] You can even aim for the, you know, for the target of a tank.

[01:02:34] But as long as the Indian companies which are trying to put in, you know, their money, building culture, which is doing real innovation to build their own products.

[01:02:42] We are going to be fine.

[01:02:44] We've got to be fine.

[01:02:46] The, and in support of the armed forces, I'll tell you something.

[01:02:49] The armed forces are absolutely committed towards indigenization.

[01:02:51] I haven't seen them coming back and then say, no, no, no, no, no.

[01:02:54] This indigenization is not important.

[01:02:56] They always are committed to indigenization.

[01:02:58] But there is also a certain organizational lethargy which sets in saying, if I can get this product from somebody, you know, and then I'm able to get a contract, then I will do it.

[01:03:08] Unfortunately, it doesn't happen that way.

[01:03:10] So slowly we starting to see instances where the Army Design Bureau and certain other organizations within the army are actually putting money into innovations.

[01:03:17] I just believe that that number or that level of, what do I call it?

[01:03:24] Spend.

[01:03:24] Spend is very less.

[01:03:26] We have the DARPA in the US.

[01:03:28] They put in millions and billions of dollars.

[01:03:31] Here we're talking about, let's say, a few hundred crores for rifles and more.

[01:03:35] But it's still a start.

[01:03:37] It's still a start.

[01:03:38] It's going to grow.

[01:03:38] It's still a start.

[01:03:39] It's a good space.

[01:03:41] Ask me, there is a desperate need for something like the DARPA.

[01:03:45] But DARPA has to be not about a fighting force.

[01:03:49] The DARPA has to be about a technology force.

[01:03:52] So you need to have people in Indian DARPA who are not the users.

[01:03:57] Right?

[01:03:58] You need to have people who can liars with the users and the industry but who are hardcore technology guys.

[01:04:03] So all of this innovation trickles down.

[01:04:05] Right?

[01:04:05] I mean, into things you can find in your house perhaps.

[01:04:08] True that.

[01:04:09] Internet came from DARPA.

[01:04:10] Absolutely.

[01:04:11] So, no, no.

[01:04:12] More than that, right?

[01:04:13] Think about it all.

[01:04:14] I mean, as you go along, right, into this military space or MICs, the fundamental difference you will start realizing is accessibility and capability here.

[01:04:31] The capabilities will come in only when you implicate manufacturing.

[01:04:36] Right?

[01:04:36] Today, for example, there will be a joint venture partner who will come and tell him that I will give you this weapon.

[01:04:42] You sell this weapon and you make a margin, which is equivalent to the margin you will make by putting blood, sweat and tears into infrastructure manufacturing and cost.

[01:04:52] And then achieving to the same margin.

[01:04:55] He's not going to tell you the strategic impact of what he's growing up.

[01:04:59] He will only tell you that you make the same kind of money.

[01:05:01] He will give you all the EBITAs and all the other stories on how much money he should make.

[01:05:06] And this investment gives you this ROI kind of stories he will tell you, but nobody will come back and tell you that you will not get this part if you have a war.

[01:05:14] That's never a part of the conversation.

[01:05:16] None of them will bring it up.

[01:05:17] So when it becomes a trade and revenue system, guys would be happy to buy, sell, make the margin.

[01:05:24] Why would they want to sweat, build manufacturing facilities and infrastructure and product design and manufacturing times on the station?

[01:05:35] Build a vendor system, supply chain.

[01:05:37] Nothing.

[01:05:37] You don't want to do anything.

[01:05:39] You can do the rest of it for 100 the effort.

[01:05:43] You need a license to import and then you find a way to import and a few people will facilitate it.

[01:05:49] And then you have the weapon in town.

[01:05:51] But what are you going to do if you have?

[01:05:53] See, nobody goes to that point.

[01:05:55] Happy world.

[01:05:56] You're not under any threat.

[01:05:57] You're fine.

[01:05:59] Kargil people flew to Israel every day.

[01:06:01] They bought in shells from Israel because we did not have it.

[01:06:05] But luckily you did not have a no-fly zone that day.

[01:06:08] But you go against near peer or peer-to-peer battles, you're in trouble.

[01:06:12] China puts out a no-fly zone, you're in trouble.

[01:06:15] So you've got to look at adversaries that you're going to face.

[01:06:19] I mean, someday.

[01:06:23] And one of the reasons I still, you know, I don't know whether it's a fair war, unfair war, who is the aggressor.

[01:06:29] But as a country, when I look at the way Russia has held back, I mean, I don't want to get into the politics of war, but the industrial base, the military-industrial complex has lasted three years against the world and they still hold on.

[01:06:45] Yeah.

[01:06:45] No, they're hardy people, right?

[01:06:46] They can survive on bread and water.

[01:06:48] It's not just the people, right?

[01:06:48] You can't give them sticks and stones, right?

[01:06:50] You still have to give them capacity.

[01:06:51] I mean, back by all of the industrial capacity.

[01:06:54] They've thrown out the kitchen sink.

[01:06:55] Yeah, you've got to sit down.

[01:06:56] Right, add the Russians and the Russians have come back every time.

[01:06:59] Yeah, for sure.

[01:06:59] Yeah.

[01:07:01] Iraq fired 200 missiles three days ago.

[01:07:04] I mean, Iran fired 200 missiles three days.

[01:07:06] My basic understanding is easily two or three million dollars a missile.

[01:07:11] I'm looking at the distance for every 500 kilometers you want to make a missile travel, it's a million dollars.

[01:07:17] I'm talking just in fuels and the steel that goes into it.

[01:07:21] So, you fire anything between, you know, you spend that day between 200 million to 500 million dollars you've used.

[01:07:31] You should have that gumption.

[01:07:33] You should have those missiles to the right.

[01:07:35] Missiles to the right.

[01:07:36] Right.

[01:07:38] So, you've got to know that MIC should be able to turn out that kind of…

[01:07:43] And they did one day of battle.

[01:07:45] Russians have four, three years of battle.

[01:07:47] Yeah, crazy.

[01:07:48] So, you can imagine what is their spend.

[01:07:49] Yeah.

[01:07:50] See, okay, I'm sure the economy has to hold and support them.

[01:07:53] But when you look at the realistic military terms, right, to cater to that many man powers firing millions of bullets in thousands of battle tank shells and thousands of artillery shells, every day is a cost.

[01:08:08] Yeah.

[01:08:08] War is all about attrition.

[01:08:10] It's not about, you know, who's the winner.

[01:08:12] No, it's all about attrition and who lost the attrition.

[01:08:15] Right.

[01:08:15] So, that's where it comes to.

[01:08:16] So, if you don't have…

[01:08:18] Like I said, the margins can all be there in nice peace time.

[01:08:21] You can sit in Delhi and say, okay, I'll give you this markup, this percentage of discount.

[01:08:26] I'm L1, L2.

[01:08:27] All that will go out of the window if you have a war.

[01:08:29] So, it's all fine in peacetime, but this is the weapons and they're built for war.

[01:08:34] They're not built for some gaming toy, you know.

[01:08:37] So, you've got to think about real-time scenarios.

[01:08:40] Simulate it.

[01:08:40] Simulate a battle.

[01:08:41] Go into one zone, theater, simulate 100,000 soldiers, keep a supply chain for one week or, you know, or extend it to one month and see what happens to the supply chain.

[01:08:51] Right.

[01:08:52] And that's when you really start understanding the reality of what will eat you.

[01:08:56] Do you think there's like a desperate need for revamp of the DRDO, the Ordnance factories and so on?

[01:09:04] Like the Ordnance factories politically right is also right today.

[01:09:10] There is no incentive as far as the Ordnance factories are concerned to keep the strategically not-

[01:09:15] Do you think like a 2.0 of those are possible or do you think that we have to sort of like rethink this entire thing?

[01:09:21] The Ordnance factories, as far as our personal view is concerned, there are certain Ordnance factories which don't deserve to be there.

[01:09:28] There are certain Ordnance factories which are very important, ought to be continued and have done good jobs.

[01:09:33] So, it's again not, you know, one approach that you need to have.

[01:09:38] As far as DRDO is concerned, I certainly believe that the DRDO has potential, still needs to be, you know, a critical pillar of defense innovation is concerned.

[01:09:49] Because take over the private sector, who's ever worked on the smallest of all the projects, something which might have no value, right?

[01:09:56] But when it comes to war, it might be the most significant.

[01:09:59] It is only the DRDO in this country.

[01:10:01] So, people can throw stones at them.

[01:10:02] The fact of the matter is this, right?

[01:10:04] The DRDO is important.

[01:10:06] If I have to look at the-

[01:10:07] What would it change?

[01:10:08] I would certainly change the way in which they're able to work with the private sector.

[01:10:12] That and we've actually shown them-

[01:10:13] Something like how perhaps Ezro is working with the space tech-

[01:10:16] No, we've actually worked with the DRDO.

[01:10:18] I mean, one of our facilities here, which is for hard chrome plating, was a collaborative project with the DRDO.

[01:10:24] But the fact is, it did not go on five years.

[01:10:26] It just got done in one year and we managed to prove and complete the entire set of test protocols with it.

[01:10:30] So, that also gives us the advantage that we are fast and nimble and we are able to push certain buttons with the DRDO as a way to get the projects closed out.

[01:10:38] Right?

[01:10:39] But if the same project was to be going on for five years, there would be nothing coming out of this one.

[01:10:43] So, I think that the private sector involvement with the DRDO is critical as far as it is going to be time bound.

[01:10:48] Things will get better only.

[01:10:50] It's the way that NASA works with the private space manufacturers in the US, right?

[01:10:53] Right.

[01:10:54] NASA definitely is not going to be very fast.

[01:10:56] Then the private space manufacturers are able to lift them up a little bit.

[01:10:59] So, DRDO is important for us.

[01:11:00] Private sector, as far as our mindsets are concerned, are absolutely going to be the most important part of the MIC in the future.

[01:11:09] Nobody but for the private sector is the ability to take risks today and take those risks blatantly.

[01:11:15] And I'm seeing plenty of my, you know, friends in the defense space all the way from the smallest to the largest ones.

[01:11:23] Guys are making small drones all the way to the guys are making male UAVs.

[01:11:27] Definitely more enthusiastic about the defense space today than they were five years back.

[01:11:31] Let me put it this way.

[01:11:33] Another thing that you also have to understand is the forces are so large and our threats are larger.

[01:11:40] So, just to cater to both of them, right?

[01:11:43] I mean, you need to have maybe my guesstimate is 200 more companies like this.

[01:11:48] If you have to clearly call it an MIC, right?

[01:11:53] You can just look at Quad City Arsenal in the US.

[01:11:56] Or you can look at Izmash in Russia.

[01:11:59] These are like complexes that hold, you can go to a war and one area can sustain a theater of war.

[01:12:07] They built it like that.

[01:12:09] So, we've, the ordnance factories are there.

[01:12:15] Their government is putting so much money into them.

[01:12:19] They've been given the infrastructure and all that, but there is a resistance for them to work with the private industry for whatever reasons.

[01:12:27] Now that it's corporate, they might have other policy decisions, but it has to be cohesive.

[01:12:35] Everybody has to work in everybody's space.

[01:12:37] You're going in one thing, you dovetail and assist other guys to get better because this is not about competition.

[01:12:43] This is our national security.

[01:12:45] At the end of the day, you require a lot more, lot, lot more people working in this space.

[01:12:51] A lot more people coming in, stepping in to build the military industrial complex.

[01:12:56] You know, it's not about a lot of people just talk about sloganing in all this, making India, XYZ various things.

[01:13:03] No, it's not about just that.

[01:13:05] It is everybody working with national security in mind.

[01:13:10] Right.

[01:13:10] So, that is not the, you know, the point that you should be looking.

[01:13:14] Nothing else that would matter.

[01:13:17] I want to add to what he's saying and also state here, just because we talk in HARPA about national security, it doesn't mean that we are not profit oriented.

[01:13:24] Yeah.

[01:13:24] We're absolutely profit oriented.

[01:13:26] Right.

[01:13:27] We absolutely are profit oriented, but it is about, can we delay the gratification?

[01:13:34] Right.

[01:13:34] So, instead of saying, I want to make my money tomorrow, so let me kind of have this, this, this short approach.

[01:13:40] Right.

[01:13:40] Or the approach that we took, say, let's put money to R&D today.

[01:13:44] It'd pay up five years, seven years from now.

[01:13:47] Maybe we'll have a unique product that can go into the global markets.

[01:13:49] We're working on two, three products which will have relevance in the global markets for the next 20 years to come.

[01:13:55] Right.

[01:13:56] But that's something that we believe in and we know about.

[01:13:59] Right.

[01:14:00] Somebody else who's got a short term wish approach may not have that same philosophy.

[01:14:03] But import is, I mean, sorry, export is restricted, right?

[01:14:07] I mean, like you have to go through the Ministry of Defense.

[01:14:10] I have to go through the Ministry of Defense, but that is a good part, right?

[01:14:12] If I have to go through the Ministry of Defense, I know it's going to happen in the right way and it's going to lead to the right hands.

[01:14:18] It's not going to go into the hands of some people I don't like.

[01:14:20] Can you explain some of the nuances there?

[01:14:21] I mean, I said, like, do you have to get empaneled with them and then what happens after?

[01:14:25] Yes. You have to be number one, an Indian manufacturer.

[01:14:27] Sure. Number two is that you obviously need to be able to kind of convince the government of India that the product that you have is something that you are the one that owns the IP on.

[01:14:37] Because if you don't own the IP on, then you need to have permissions from somebody else who might be your joint venture partner.

[01:14:43] Other geopolitics comes into place. Right.

[01:14:45] For example, if I have a partnership with an American company that I'm trying to sell into a market which is friendly to India, but in the Americans don't like that I say to that particular country things can go bad.

[01:14:54] Right. So that's number two.

[01:14:56] Number three is that the Ministry of Defense is super aggressive at this point in time vis-a-vis exports.

[01:15:02] It understood very clearly that Indian defense requires export markets as well.

[01:15:06] And the fact is also that there are more Indian companies today which are capable of exploring those opportunities and exports.

[01:15:12] It also gives us a leverage geopolitically with our countries, which was not there before and which was not there in the mind itself.

[01:15:20] So today, regulations wise, everything is heading in the right direction as far as defense exports is concerned.

[01:15:25] What needs to happen is we need to have more companies who are aggressive enough in terms of product development so that they're able to match up with the specs which foreign countries require as well.

[01:15:34] So, I always have gone when you could sell the incest rifle bundle it together and then give it to the closest neighbor that you had and then expect them to keep them out shut.

[01:15:41] They would have done it back if it's not up in the back. Right.

[01:15:45] There are countries in our neighborhood who've taken equipment from the Chinese.

[01:15:48] The Chinese have given them 40 equipment and they've come back saying that that thing is a rusting piece of crap. Right.

[01:15:55] So, everyone understands today that geopolitics on its own cannot also match up. It needs to be accompanied with something that can really do the job for mission criteria because as much as we need equipment in bad times, those guys need equipment in bad times.

[01:16:09] Right. Right. So, your product is good. Your government is positive. It'll work. And once it starts working, then it's a very long process.

[01:16:16] It's very difficult to move you out of the inventory. Right. So, when you think about developing the industry as a whole, right, I mean, who can we look to sort of emulate? Right. I mean, have the Chinese like caught up to a degree of quality where I mean they're like really amazing and like they can compete with any of the US folks or…

[01:16:39] I'll take one minute to answer that and then he's going to be able to give you better answers. I don't think the Chinese are going to be lagging in quality. They've evolved very quickly. They might have copied some things, but they've actually managed to evolve substantially.

[01:16:50] Right. But we don't know. Right. What we hear is basically information that comes from third party sources. Are the Americans good? Yes, they're good. Are the Germans good? Very good.

[01:17:00] We will not be able to kind of do the kind of product development as the Germans and the Americans because some of that is brutally expensive. Right. We're not a country that can kind of, you know, make whole plated weapons. We need to be able to saturate, right, in times of war, put out a lot of it. Right. So, some of that stuff may not never be, you know, it might be good as an exhibition stuff, but then never is going to be useful in times of war.

[01:17:26] Third is being able to manage high levels of quality within timelines is the most important for us. So, I think there is no one country to emulate. We have to get the best out of these guys. Right. And we know, you know, instead of emulating a country, start trying to emulate OEMs is better for us.

[01:17:43] Yeah. See, China's caught up a long time ago, especially in the field of ammunition. They always believed that, you know, quantity has a quality of its own. Right. So, me carrying 60 rounds of really good bullets, I'll carry 600 rounds. And, you know, when the guy is empty after I've offered 60, I still have rounds left. So, that's where they were coming from.

[01:18:06] So, they built up plants. They have plants everywhere in the world. They have set up plants in Africa. They're setting up plants in Central, in the Caucasus, in the Central Asian countries.

[01:18:20] So, they've, and a lot of their planning has been what the Soviet Union did earlier, like when we, they set up industry in all the countries they thought were friendly.

[01:18:30] So that they could also use the same systems when they got there for any, any time of usage. French in Africa always flew their equipment.

[01:18:41] China supplanted, Ethiopia supplanted in Djibouti just to supply into Africa. So, amazing.

[01:18:47] So, they built up, you know, if I have to deploy into, if India has to deploy into the UN forces in Africa, right?

[01:18:56] Ferry everything continuously. There's a supply chain happening every day that's managing their ammunition load, logistics load, everything else.

[01:19:05] So, China has built enough and more. And they've just decided that now that they built solar surplus, they start exporting.

[01:19:14] So, that is the kind of MICs that need to be built and we're not there.

[01:19:20] What will take time? I mean, I think my guess, another 50 ammunition plants would still be fine to supply just to Indian requirements.

[01:19:28] And not even on a expeditionary kind of warfare.

[01:19:31] I'm saying just internally managing our problems, we should be able to build more on our requirements.

[01:19:38] How much does geopolitics factor into everything that you're doing?

[01:19:42] I mean, we're living in like a crazy world right now, right?

[01:19:47] Multipolarity is like the thing, right?

[01:19:50] And there are plenty of wars and by many different perspectives, I mean, we're already in a sort of a World War III kind of a situation.

[01:19:57] We just haven't perhaps, I mean, realized, right?

[01:20:00] So, how does all of this chaos just factor into whatever you do?

[01:20:05] And how does it inform your decision?

[01:20:07] I'll give you two, three stories.

[01:20:08] I had a friend of mine, the moment October 7th happened last year and you had the attack on Israel.

[01:20:13] Next three months, a friend of mine who works in the US munitions and weapons bases had his hands full doing nothing but selling weapons kits to Israel.

[01:20:24] A country which prides itself in having its own military industrial complex.

[01:20:29] They had 100,000 reservists coming back to join the force and they did not have enough guns.

[01:20:34] Right?

[01:20:34] And when you give a gun to a guy, you better give a good gun.

[01:20:37] Because Israel understands that those guys are not cannon fodder.

[01:20:41] They're highly trained people, many of them highly educated people, possibly working in other countries who've come back to fight for the country and you don't want to lose that kind of potential talent.

[01:20:51] So, they did not want to at any point in time give them guns which were faulty or guns which were not up to the mark.

[01:20:58] And they also had to give them guns which were not there.

[01:21:01] So, you understand this, that's geopolitics for you.

[01:21:03] One single day can change things around.

[01:21:05] Right.

[01:21:06] Another thing, you know, you had the Russia war and for the next several months we were bombarded with requirements for CNC missions.

[01:21:11] I'm sure you've spoken with people also who've been at the receiving end of this particular inquiry.

[01:21:16] Right?

[01:21:17] So, geopolitics across the world is both a positive is also a negative.

[01:21:21] The day that it becomes negative for us should be identified today and we possibly should be looking at ways and means in which we can prevent that from becoming a nose around our necks.

[01:21:32] Which is why as a strategy today, we are firmly in favor of using geopolitical courage to try and make sure that we're able to get into as many markets as possible.

[01:21:42] Because those markets will get us opportunities to prove weapons.

[01:21:45] Those markets will get us opportunities to kind of get our weapons better.

[01:21:48] When they go into service with any force, they always get better.

[01:21:51] Understand this.

[01:21:52] Whether they go to the Indian force or go to some other force, any force makes it weapons better.

[01:21:56] It's a feedback loop.

[01:21:56] Because you get that feedback.

[01:21:58] You try your test in different conditions, different weather.

[01:22:01] And I'm not even stating here that, you know, this is out of the ordinary.

[01:22:05] In fact, the Americans have been doing that for?

[01:22:09] Last 50 years.

[01:22:10] Last 50 years.

[01:22:12] It's about confidence.

[01:22:13] I'm not hearing a propaganda here.

[01:22:15] I'm actually stating a fact that is purely coming from the cockiness and the confidence it comes from being able to make real weapons.

[01:22:21] From having taken risks and got results the hard way.

[01:22:26] So, for us, geopolitics is good.

[01:22:28] Whether the geopolitical train of events will cause a wreck tomorrow or not, we don't.

[01:22:35] Right?

[01:22:35] It can come to our doorstep as well.

[01:22:38] Because World War II, World War I did not start off and then become a full-fledged world war.

[01:22:44] It started off in small pockets and then finally became a world war.

[01:22:47] We possibly are looking at or maybe sleepwalking, like I said, into another World War III.

[01:22:52] Right.

[01:22:52] Right.

[01:22:53] It's better to be ready at this point in time than to kind of think that geopolitics will, you know, ease itself out.

[01:23:00] I don't see it going away.

[01:23:02] Right.

[01:23:02] See, imagine it's like a COVID moment.

[01:23:05] You were not prepared.

[01:23:06] You were running into a skelter.

[01:23:08] You did not have people making simple things like masks in India, PPE kits, right?

[01:23:13] Just kids.

[01:23:14] So, you got to be prepared.

[01:23:16] You've learned it.

[01:23:17] You've seen what happened five years ago.

[01:23:19] So, you got to be ready for it.

[01:23:20] Or four years ago, whatever, whenever it happened.

[01:23:23] So, you know, these are moments that happen.

[01:23:25] Suddenly, you have a face shifting the world order.

[01:23:31] Some which are predictable, some which are not, some which are known, which are not.

[01:23:35] Ours is known, but you're not prepared.

[01:23:37] Right.

[01:23:38] That was unknown.

[01:23:39] It came in as something that you couldn't see here.

[01:23:42] But this is, you see, you hear, you feel it.

[01:23:46] And you sense it's happening around.

[01:23:49] So, you better start being prepared for it.

[01:23:51] Right.

[01:23:52] So, circling back to Triple S, what do you have coming up in the next,

[01:23:59] maybe 18 months to a couple of years that, you know, keeps you up at night?

[01:24:04] That is the most exciting thing that you're looking forward to?

[01:24:08] Many things.

[01:24:10] We have multiple programs running, not just in, since we also do ammunition.

[01:24:17] We have different calibers coming out.

[01:24:19] We have a general purpose machine gun coming out, which will,

[01:24:24] so now Michigan's a categorized into light machine gun, medium machine gun,

[01:24:27] and then heavy machine gun, 50 cal coming down to 7.6 to 51,

[01:24:33] and then sometimes even to 5.56.

[01:24:36] So, Negev has, it's got the Negev 5, which is the 5.56,

[01:24:39] and the 7, which is the 7.6 to 51.

[01:24:42] But we want to do-tail it into a single caliber.

[01:24:45] We want to bring in something that has the heating power of a heavy machine gun,

[01:24:50] but the form factor of a light machine gun.

[01:24:53] So, we're working on specific calibers.

[01:24:55] Like, for example, we might, we might, it's still hypothetical that design phases now,

[01:25:01] but we will focus on something that we've gotten good designing our 338 sniper rifles.

[01:25:06] So, we've known the ballistics of the weapon.

[01:25:09] We know the energy it can impart on the round,

[01:25:12] and we know what it's capable of doing at a kilometer and a half.

[01:25:15] So, we might be looking at a specific caliber to grow up on the, on the,

[01:25:22] let's say, knowledge we've built of and the experience we've built on this.

[01:25:26] So, we would build something that would have the heating power of a heavy machine gun

[01:25:30] and the form factor of a light gun.

[01:25:32] So, that's something.

[01:25:33] As far as business goes, that's definitely one of the pillars

[01:25:36] because machine guns, not many countries have the kind of machine guns we're talking about.

[01:25:41] That's a whole new program that we mounted.

[01:25:44] We'll be in new markets.

[01:25:46] Right.

[01:25:47] Hopefully, five to six markets for both ammunition is also weapons.

[01:25:54] We have plans of being in the U.S. civilian market for weapons.

[01:25:59] The kind of IP that we built in, we believe, is something that should find a home,

[01:26:06] not just in India, but also in certain civilian markets.

[01:26:08] It's a scale-wise, the U.S. civilian market is by far the best of the law.

[01:26:12] So, in a couple of years from today, yes, definitely, yes.

[01:26:15] We want to be in those markets.

[01:26:19] Now, R&D-wise, we're always working on refinement of some of these weapons.

[01:26:24] We're experimenting with certain materials.

[01:26:26] We want to have a horses for courses approach.

[01:26:29] So, it'll be, you know, a certain kind of a weapon for special forces applications,

[01:26:35] completely different set of weapons for infantry applications.

[01:26:37] Special forces weapons have to be built, designed very differently.

[01:26:41] So, in that sense, we're trying to kind of do that differentiator.

[01:26:44] We'll be in medium caliber in the next 18 months.

[01:26:48] Both weapons is also ammunition.

[01:26:51] That's going to be our next progression.

[01:26:53] And now, what is happening is instead of being told, you know,

[01:26:57] this is what you should be doing, in certain cases,

[01:26:59] we are taking on the mantle of figuring out whether, you know,

[01:27:03] where the opportunities will not be only there in India,

[01:27:05] but the opportunities will be there globally, right?

[01:27:08] Because, again, the knowledge of the supply chain is very apparent to us.

[01:27:13] Fundraising?

[01:27:15] Oh, hopefully something interesting in the next two years.

[01:27:18] But as of today, we've just been, you know, living off,

[01:27:23] how do I put it this way?

[01:27:26] We've got internal accruples, a mix of promoters' capital,

[01:27:31] third-party debt funds, working capital.

[01:27:34] That's basically been the way we funded ourselves so far.

[01:27:37] We've not gone and raised any money from, you know,

[01:27:40] international investors.

[01:27:41] One is difficult to kind of do that as well in our space.

[01:27:45] But hopefully, in maybe a couple of years from today,

[01:27:48] we'd like to be, you know, better capitalized,

[01:27:54] if I may put it this way.

[01:27:55] I don't know what source it's going to be, right?

[01:27:57] No one can tell you as to what that source might be.

[01:28:00] Yeah, but better capitalized.

[01:28:02] IP or something, perhaps.

[01:28:03] Maybe.

[01:28:05] Maybe, but I can't really say.

[01:28:06] Does that offer, like, unique advantages for you?

[01:28:09] I mean, like, in the sector that you operate,

[01:28:11] being a public company?

[01:28:12] Or, I mean, is that, like, a hindrance?

[01:28:13] Yes.

[01:28:14] Now, again, going public is something that requires a lot of time.

[01:28:20] It takes several months of preparation to file your DRHP

[01:28:23] in the first place itself.

[01:28:25] Second is the kind of disclosures that you need to do, right?

[01:28:29] We have to have a cost-benefit analysis internally.

[01:28:32] Does it make sense to have those disclosures, right?

[01:28:34] So all those disclosures may not even be possible

[01:28:36] from our perspective, right?

[01:28:39] Third is, to what extent do I need

[01:28:43] that capital, right?

[01:28:45] Is it, for example, going to be capital

[01:28:48] that I need to, for example,

[01:28:49] for instance, set up a whole new plant,

[01:28:51] which I might, you know, not be able to do

[01:28:54] without having very large sources of capital, right?

[01:28:58] If I need to set up a proponent plant, for example,

[01:29:00] is that something that I need at this point in time

[01:29:02] or can I do without it?

[01:29:04] Even that is going to be a function

[01:29:05] of how soon I go into the public markets.

[01:29:07] But for now, we have no such plans.

[01:29:09] We're just sitting around and then seeing as to,

[01:29:11] you know, what might be the right time.

[01:29:14] Fundraising is definitely an important element

[01:29:17] of us to be able to run business

[01:29:19] because the larger the projects become,

[01:29:21] the more that the fundraising becomes critical.

[01:29:23] Right.

[01:29:23] Right?

[01:29:24] And they are getting critical,

[01:29:26] more and more critical as time goes on.

[01:29:28] So that is a key strategic decision

[01:29:29] that we're sitting around and then mulling over,

[01:29:31] spending more time on today

[01:29:33] than we were maybe about a year back.

[01:29:35] But no decisions have been taken

[01:29:36] as far as public markets.

[01:29:40] It's already taken us a lot of intro

[01:29:42] from what we put it.

[01:29:43] I mean, as you're seeing the weapons facility,

[01:29:45] but the arms facilities,

[01:29:48] the ammunition facilities,

[01:29:49] a 200-acre campus.

[01:29:52] Oh, boy.

[01:29:53] You need magazines to store propelite,

[01:29:55] powders, assembly lines, testing areas.

[01:29:59] So that's a 200-acre facility.

[01:30:01] You need that kind of space

[01:30:03] because the magazine silos that are put there

[01:30:06] require a 200-meter radius of no interference,

[01:30:10] no buildings, no people,

[01:30:12] no nothing in that area.

[01:30:13] So you have to isolate it.

[01:30:15] Highly complex raw materials.

[01:30:18] And also safety.

[01:30:21] You don't want it to affect

[01:30:23] any of the neighboring villages.

[01:30:25] So we did find a spot good enough

[01:30:27] to keep us isolated from a lot of population.

[01:30:32] Also to hill ranges,

[01:30:34] that keeps us pretty much covered.

[01:30:37] So there's a lot of good,

[01:30:40] what do you call the manufacturing space

[01:30:43] that we acquired?

[01:30:45] For now, it's good enough

[01:30:46] to keep us going for the next

[01:30:47] maybe two, three years.

[01:30:49] Right.

[01:30:49] Use this time to plan our next moves.

[01:30:52] Amazing.

[01:30:53] Last few questions.

[01:30:54] I know, I mean,

[01:30:55] I've taken a lot of your weekend time,

[01:30:58] but, you know,

[01:30:58] from everything you've learned

[01:31:00] about this sector

[01:31:00] and from your own journey, right?

[01:31:02] I mean, if you were to sort of

[01:31:04] give advice to folks who are listening

[01:31:06] and perhaps, you know,

[01:31:08] like a smart engineer

[01:31:09] who's thinking of doing something

[01:31:10] in the space

[01:31:11] or, you know,

[01:31:12] a founder,

[01:31:13] a wannabe founder, etc.

[01:31:15] Right?

[01:31:15] Who are thinking about

[01:31:16] building something in this space,

[01:31:17] if you could give like,

[01:31:19] maybe like one or two,

[01:31:20] three pieces of advice.

[01:31:21] I think the first piece of advice

[01:31:23] is be patient.

[01:31:24] Right.

[01:31:25] You're not going to get,

[01:31:28] you know,

[01:31:28] instantaneously.

[01:31:29] How can someone today

[01:31:31] get started?

[01:31:31] I think one of the simplest ways

[01:31:33] in which someone can get started off,

[01:31:34] at least if he wants to know

[01:31:36] what the requirement of the forces is,

[01:31:39] is by going online,

[01:31:40] checking out the Army Design Bureau's

[01:31:42] annual compendium of

[01:31:44] future

[01:31:46] solutions.

[01:31:47] Future solutions that are needed.

[01:31:49] That's one of the best ways.

[01:31:51] I keep telling people

[01:31:51] the Army itself has become very

[01:31:54] transparent in these matters.

[01:31:56] They actually publish

[01:31:57] a compendium of

[01:31:59] future solutions which are needed.

[01:32:01] That's one of the best places

[01:32:02] to start off.

[01:32:03] Number two is choose your poison wisely.

[01:32:05] wisely.

[01:32:06] Right.

[01:32:07] Don't try to kind of

[01:32:08] be in too many places

[01:32:10] at the same time.

[01:32:10] If you are a guy who understands

[01:32:12] UAVs and drones,

[01:32:13] choose your

[01:32:15] niche in that particular space

[01:32:17] and find an area where

[01:32:18] you are not going to be competing

[01:32:20] with 100 people.

[01:32:21] Right.

[01:32:22] I see too many

[01:32:23] quadcopter guys today.

[01:32:24] That's one of the reasons.

[01:32:25] Right.

[01:32:25] And not everyone actually

[01:32:26] has a USP.

[01:32:27] A few of them have,

[01:32:29] not everybody has.

[01:32:30] Third is,

[01:32:33] it possibly will take

[01:32:34] longer time.

[01:32:35] You have to delay gratification.

[01:32:38] But if you are able to work

[01:32:39] on your own technologies,

[01:32:40] be they hardware or software,

[01:32:43] right, do so.

[01:32:44] Do not neglect hardware.

[01:32:46] The hardware is the most

[01:32:48] critical part in defense.

[01:32:51] The software,

[01:32:53] it's important.

[01:32:54] Sensors,

[01:32:56] super important.

[01:32:57] If you're not able to integrate

[01:32:58] all of these together,

[01:32:59] you may not be

[01:33:01] having a sustainable

[01:33:02] advantage.

[01:33:04] Do not think about

[01:33:06] raising capital

[01:33:07] as being a

[01:33:10] solution to all of your

[01:33:11] troubles.

[01:33:11] It's a milestone.

[01:33:12] Right.

[01:33:13] As of today,

[01:33:14] there are more guys

[01:33:14] who are entering into the fray

[01:33:15] with sources of capital.

[01:33:18] That's a great thing for you,

[01:33:19] which means to say that

[01:33:20] the landing

[01:33:21] is not likely to be

[01:33:24] bounty

[01:33:25] too quick.

[01:33:27] Right.

[01:33:27] But defense companies

[01:33:29] companies are not like

[01:33:29] other companies

[01:33:30] in the sense that

[01:33:31] you don't have too long

[01:33:32] a runway.

[01:33:33] You're not going to be

[01:33:34] spending a million dollars

[01:33:36] every month,

[01:33:37] right,

[01:33:37] trying to push forward

[01:33:38] your product.

[01:33:39] You have to be very

[01:33:40] choosy in your projects

[01:33:41] and your programs.

[01:33:42] Right.

[01:33:43] Try to identify,

[01:33:44] for the first timers,

[01:33:45] try to identify areas

[01:33:46] where your technology

[01:33:47] can have civilian

[01:33:48] applications.

[01:33:48] It is a great opportunity

[01:33:50] if you can also

[01:33:52] made your technologies

[01:33:53] into civilian applications.

[01:33:57] What about all the

[01:33:58] licensing,

[01:33:59] the regulation,

[01:34:00] all of that?

[01:34:00] Not all businesses,

[01:34:01] not all of it,

[01:34:02] not all of it requires

[01:34:03] a kind of licensing

[01:34:04] that we require.

[01:34:06] Right.

[01:34:06] Not all of it.

[01:34:07] For example,

[01:34:07] somebody who wants to

[01:34:08] work in UAVs

[01:34:09] can actually just go there,

[01:34:10] start his project

[01:34:11] from the labs

[01:34:12] and plenty of guys

[01:34:13] actually start their

[01:34:14] projects from labs

[01:34:14] of IISC

[01:34:15] and IITM address.

[01:34:16] Are there specific grants

[01:34:17] or like incubation programs?

[01:34:19] Yes.

[01:34:19] There is a program

[01:34:20] which the Indian Army

[01:34:21] and certain other parts

[01:34:23] of the Indian Armed Forces

[01:34:25] put out.

[01:34:26] These are called

[01:34:27] IDEX programs.

[01:34:28] You know,

[01:34:29] you can go online again,

[01:34:30] check out the website

[01:34:31] of the Army Design Bureau.

[01:34:32] It's available there.

[01:34:33] The Indian Air Force

[01:34:34] has put out

[01:34:35] a very successful program

[01:34:36] called the

[01:34:36] Mehar Baba Competition.

[01:34:38] All of those companies

[01:34:39] which have won

[01:34:40] that particular competition

[01:34:40] are doing exceedingly well today.

[01:34:42] Right.

[01:34:43] Because it gives them

[01:34:43] that legitimacy,

[01:34:46] it gives them credibility

[01:34:47] after having won

[01:34:48] that program.

[01:34:49] The Air Force

[01:34:49] is very, very particular

[01:34:50] about technology.

[01:34:51] So is the Navy.

[01:34:52] Right.

[01:34:53] All of the changes

[01:34:54] which you're seeing

[01:34:54] as far as the defense

[01:34:56] ecosystem is concerned

[01:34:57] is positive.

[01:34:57] The Army is putting

[01:34:58] in phenomenal efforts

[01:34:59] into indigenization

[01:35:00] all the way up

[01:35:01] to the chief, right?

[01:35:02] Chief, vice chief,

[01:35:03] deputy chief,

[01:35:03] everybody's involved in that.

[01:35:05] I can only see positives.

[01:35:07] I might occasionally

[01:35:08] have disagreements

[01:35:09] but those disagreements

[01:35:10] are not the reason

[01:35:11] why I would say,

[01:35:12] you know,

[01:35:12] you're not doing your job.

[01:35:13] I believe they're doing

[01:35:13] a great job.

[01:35:14] It's just the fact

[01:35:15] that we might have

[01:35:15] differences of opinion

[01:35:16] and those differences

[01:35:17] of opinion are fair

[01:35:18] because, you know,

[01:35:20] private sector

[01:35:21] is not as sensitive

[01:35:23] to authority

[01:35:24] as the armed forces are.

[01:35:26] Right.

[01:35:27] We disagree.

[01:35:29] We tend to be open

[01:35:31] about certain things

[01:35:32] but then has

[01:35:32] at no point in time

[01:35:34] do we actually state here

[01:35:35] that, you know,

[01:35:37] we need to buy foreign stuff.

[01:35:39] That is one thing

[01:35:39] that people never state

[01:35:40] very openly.

[01:35:41] Buy foreign stuff

[01:35:41] when it is absolutely necessary

[01:35:43] but if you can avoid it,

[01:35:44] buy indigenous stuff.

[01:35:45] Put the indigenous stuff

[01:35:46] through the paces,

[01:35:47] through the trials,

[01:35:48] right?

[01:35:49] Handhold those guys

[01:35:50] that need me

[01:35:50] because finally

[01:35:51] when it comes to war,

[01:35:52] those are the only guys

[01:35:53] who will actually

[01:35:53] give you solutions.

[01:35:55] Right.

[01:35:55] Anything from the product

[01:35:56] and engineering side

[01:35:57] of things.

[01:35:58] Like,

[01:35:58] what is a good start?

[01:35:59] Like I said,

[01:36:00] gestation for a company

[01:36:02] takes time.

[01:36:03] You know,

[01:36:04] the time

[01:36:04] to be in the spaces.

[01:36:06] Say if you're building

[01:36:07] a,

[01:36:09] let's say,

[01:36:09] a white goods company,

[01:36:10] you could have your turnovers

[01:36:12] starting at,

[01:36:13] you know,

[01:36:14] 18 months.

[01:36:15] We know that

[01:36:16] you're only building

[01:36:17] after that.

[01:36:18] For us,

[01:36:18] gestations can be

[01:36:19] two,

[01:36:19] three times that.

[01:36:21] And sometimes,

[01:36:22] and in India,

[01:36:24] our only customer is Dami.

[01:36:25] The forces.

[01:36:26] We can't sell it

[01:36:28] to the civilians,

[01:36:29] not the weapons

[01:36:29] we build

[01:36:30] for the military.

[01:36:30] So,

[01:36:32] we have to go through

[01:36:33] the processes

[01:36:34] that they build.

[01:36:35] So,

[01:36:35] one of the best things

[01:36:36] would be that,

[01:36:38] you know,

[01:36:38] that they're encouraging

[01:36:39] on so many fronts

[01:36:40] that they use

[01:36:42] two weapons

[01:36:42] that they bought

[01:36:43] because there's nobody

[01:36:44] building them here

[01:36:45] to incorporate

[01:36:46] a few of the systems

[01:36:47] that the private guys

[01:36:48] build into their operations

[01:36:50] and then start getting

[01:36:52] familiarized with it.

[01:36:53] You know,

[01:36:53] not just on test ranges

[01:36:54] but in actual usages.

[01:36:57] Not a standalone

[01:36:58] but,

[01:36:59] you know,

[01:36:59] you bring in a mix

[01:37:00] of systems.

[01:37:02] So,

[01:37:02] some which are familiar,

[01:37:03] some which you've imported,

[01:37:04] some which you've used

[01:37:05] for 20 years

[01:37:06] plus the new ones,

[01:37:07] new kids on the block

[01:37:08] and that's how you,

[01:37:09] you don't send

[01:37:11] a freshly minted soldier

[01:37:13] into war.

[01:37:14] He's always led

[01:37:14] by a guy

[01:37:15] who's fought three wars,

[01:37:16] a team that's fought

[01:37:17] multiple operations.

[01:37:18] So,

[01:37:18] that's how you,

[01:37:19] you know,

[01:37:20] you induct

[01:37:21] a person into the system.

[01:37:23] The same way

[01:37:24] you should induct

[01:37:24] weapons into the system.

[01:37:26] There's weapons

[01:37:27] you've used for 20 years,

[01:37:28] 10 years,

[01:37:29] 5 years

[01:37:29] and then there's

[01:37:30] this brand new system.

[01:37:31] So,

[01:37:32] you,

[01:37:32] you do tail it

[01:37:33] into this program.

[01:37:35] Right?

[01:37:35] Just the way

[01:37:36] you do tail

[01:37:37] men into the programs,

[01:37:39] you bring the materials

[01:37:39] into the programs.

[01:37:41] See,

[01:37:42] nobody flies a Rafale squadron

[01:37:44] up into,

[01:37:44] no,

[01:37:45] there is who is flying

[01:37:46] out there.

[01:37:47] The guys are,

[01:37:47] you know,

[01:37:48] providing overwatch,

[01:37:49] cover for these guys.

[01:37:50] Same way,

[01:37:51] you should bring into play

[01:37:52] the weapons

[01:37:53] that are locally made

[01:37:53] so that

[01:37:54] you,

[01:37:54] you get familiarized

[01:37:56] with it,

[01:37:57] you get user interface

[01:37:59] comfort,

[01:38:00] which is,

[01:38:01] which is something

[01:38:02] that I think

[01:38:03] we need to see

[01:38:03] it happen.

[01:38:05] You know,

[01:38:05] otherwise we're mostly

[01:38:06] RFP to RFP,

[01:38:08] paperwork,

[01:38:08] testing.

[01:38:08] And manufacturing

[01:38:09] is going to be

[01:38:10] a critical element,

[01:38:11] right?

[01:38:11] Understand this,

[01:38:12] defense is going to be

[01:38:12] the most manufacturing

[01:38:13] heavy sector.

[01:38:14] Right?

[01:38:15] Going forward.

[01:38:15] Going forward.

[01:38:16] Yes.

[01:38:16] Going forward.

[01:38:17] Yes.

[01:38:17] It is.

[01:38:18] Yeah.

[01:38:19] And manufacturing,

[01:38:20] the expertise itself

[01:38:21] is like

[01:38:23] a super critical

[01:38:24] skill for any

[01:38:25] country,

[01:38:25] right?

[01:38:25] I mean,

[01:38:26] just simply going

[01:38:27] from a prototype

[01:38:28] to a production

[01:38:29] line takes

[01:38:30] a whole bunch

[01:38:31] of know-how

[01:38:32] that is really

[01:38:34] critical.

[01:38:35] Not just that.

[01:38:36] Today we made

[01:38:37] the 338,

[01:38:37] right?

[01:38:38] So there's no

[01:38:39] denial on this.

[01:38:41] So the regime

[01:38:42] internationally also

[01:38:43] looks at how far

[01:38:44] you come on the

[01:38:45] threshold.

[01:38:45] The moment you

[01:38:46] hit a threshold

[01:38:47] point,

[01:38:47] they will make

[01:38:48] sure that some

[01:38:49] of their

[01:38:49] equipment,

[01:38:50] which is never

[01:38:50] to be given

[01:38:51] to you,

[01:38:51] was released.

[01:38:52] So they also

[01:38:53] play business.

[01:38:54] It's not just

[01:38:55] about technology,

[01:38:57] manufacturing.

[01:38:58] It's a lot

[01:38:58] about how

[01:38:58] business functions.

[01:39:00] So 338s are

[01:39:01] made in India,

[01:39:02] suddenly you have

[01:39:02] Germans willing

[01:39:03] to sell.

[01:39:04] You have the

[01:39:06] Americans willing

[01:39:06] to sell.

[01:39:07] Then ITAR

[01:39:08] goes out of

[01:39:09] the window.

[01:39:10] So there is

[01:39:11] a whole bunch

[01:39:11] of other things

[01:39:12] that gets

[01:39:13] watered out.

[01:39:14] There might

[01:39:14] be a time

[01:39:15] where they

[01:39:15] won't even

[01:39:15] talk to you

[01:39:16] about a 338.

[01:39:17] It's like,

[01:39:18] no.

[01:39:19] But then suddenly

[01:39:20] you see Indians

[01:39:21] manufacturing,

[01:39:22] then you have

[01:39:22] a whole bunch

[01:39:23] of companies

[01:39:24] across the world

[01:39:25] willing to give

[01:39:25] us the same

[01:39:26] quality standards.

[01:39:28] So that's

[01:39:29] when you realize

[01:39:29] how much you

[01:39:30] can break them

[01:39:31] down too.

[01:39:32] Oh,

[01:39:32] we're breaking

[01:39:32] them down.

[01:39:33] I have had

[01:39:34] international

[01:39:34] companies who

[01:39:35] are now looking

[01:39:36] at us.

[01:39:37] We're doing it

[01:39:38] studying us,

[01:39:39] being aware of

[01:39:39] the kind of

[01:39:40] products that

[01:39:40] we put out.

[01:39:41] Amazing.

[01:39:41] Doing their

[01:39:42] own research

[01:39:43] about us.

[01:39:44] And that was

[01:39:45] not the case

[01:39:45] three, four

[01:39:46] years back.

[01:39:46] Absolutely not.

[01:39:48] Right.

[01:39:49] Yeah.

[01:39:49] I remember one

[01:39:50] of the questions

[01:39:50] I asked,

[01:39:51] can you build

[01:39:51] a sling for

[01:39:52] a rifle,

[01:39:53] not the rifle.

[01:39:53] can you just

[01:39:54] build a sling

[01:39:55] for us?

[01:39:56] And I said,

[01:39:57] sure.

[01:39:58] Well,

[01:39:59] that was how

[01:40:00] questions come

[01:40:00] at us.

[01:40:01] Our egos

[01:40:02] went for a

[01:40:02] toss,

[01:40:03] but we just

[01:40:03] bit our teeth

[01:40:05] and said,

[01:40:05] okay.

[01:40:06] Right.

[01:40:06] That was not

[01:40:07] a good time

[01:40:08] for us because

[01:40:09] our egos

[01:40:10] would get burnt,

[01:40:12] stomped into

[01:40:12] the ground

[01:40:12] pretty much

[01:40:13] every other

[01:40:13] day.

[01:40:14] But you know

[01:40:14] what?

[01:40:15] Like I said,

[01:40:16] patience.

[01:40:17] You got to

[01:40:17] take a lot of

[01:40:18] crap before

[01:40:19] you're able to

[01:40:19] stand up and

[01:40:20] say,

[01:40:20] hey,

[01:40:20] listen,

[01:40:20] that's

[01:40:21] something

[01:40:21] that we

[01:40:21] built.

[01:40:22] Persiviance,

[01:40:23] patience,

[01:40:23] both of

[01:40:24] them.

[01:40:24] You got to

[01:40:24] sustain it

[01:40:25] over a

[01:40:25] period of

[01:40:26] time.

[01:40:27] All right.

[01:40:29] Man,

[01:40:29] we've covered

[01:40:30] a lot of

[01:40:31] things.

[01:40:32] Just to

[01:40:33] sort of

[01:40:33] close the

[01:40:34] conversation

[01:40:34] on a

[01:40:35] lighter note,

[01:40:35] I mean,

[01:40:36] any books

[01:40:36] or podcasts

[01:40:37] that you

[01:40:37] would suggest?

[01:40:39] We go

[01:40:40] heavy on

[01:40:40] podcasts.

[01:40:41] That's for

[01:40:41] the guys

[01:40:42] who are

[01:40:44] big defense

[01:40:45] enthusiasts.

[01:40:46] And for us,

[01:40:48] podcasts would

[01:40:49] pretty much

[01:40:50] be all

[01:40:50] technical.

[01:40:51] The

[01:40:51] Hornady

[01:40:51] podcast,

[01:40:52] the

[01:40:52] Vortex

[01:40:52] Nation

[01:40:52] podcast.

[01:40:53] These are

[01:40:53] all very

[01:40:54] gun-oriented

[01:40:54] podcasts,

[01:40:55] which happen

[01:40:56] in the

[01:40:56] US.

[01:40:56] But I

[01:40:57] don't like

[01:40:57] certain

[01:40:59] podcasts,

[01:40:59] which are

[01:41:00] in India.

[01:41:02] I like

[01:41:03] the ANI

[01:41:03] podcast,

[01:41:04] which is

[01:41:04] an interesting

[01:41:05] one.

[01:41:18] I think

[01:41:19] interesting

[01:41:19] interesting.

[01:41:19] I prefer

[01:41:20] listening to

[01:41:21] a longer

[01:41:21] podcast,

[01:41:22] 10 minutes

[01:41:23] short kind

[01:41:24] of stuff.

[01:41:25] Books is

[01:41:26] concerned,

[01:41:26] I'd say

[01:41:26] Freedom

[01:41:27] Forge.

[01:41:27] That's one

[01:41:27] of the

[01:41:28] books that

[01:41:28] everyone's

[01:41:28] going to

[01:41:29] read.

[01:41:30] It's

[01:41:30] about how

[01:41:31] the American

[01:41:33] industry

[01:41:33] managed to

[01:41:34] put together

[01:41:35] the whole

[01:41:36] ecosystem to

[01:41:36] fight wars

[01:41:37] during possibly

[01:41:39] the most

[01:41:40] challenging

[01:41:40] of all the

[01:41:41] times,

[01:41:41] Second World

[01:41:41] War

[01:41:42] Thrones.

[01:41:44] There's

[01:41:45] another

[01:41:45] book called

[01:41:46] Weapon

[01:41:46] Visits,

[01:41:47] which is

[01:41:47] about the

[01:41:47] Israeli

[01:41:48] military

[01:41:48] industrial

[01:41:49] complex.

[01:41:50] Again,

[01:41:50] a very

[01:41:50] interesting

[01:41:51] book.

[01:41:54] It should

[01:41:54] not always

[01:41:55] be about

[01:41:55] weapons.

[01:41:56] It's got

[01:41:57] to be

[01:41:57] about other

[01:41:57] stuff as

[01:41:58] well.

[01:42:00] I'm

[01:42:00] thinking as

[01:42:01] to what

[01:42:01] are the

[01:42:01] other

[01:42:01] books that

[01:42:02] I might

[01:42:02] have read

[01:42:02] off late.

[01:42:03] I'm a

[01:42:03] big

[01:42:03] Frederick

[01:42:04] Forsyth

[01:42:04] guy.

[01:42:05] Gauran

[01:42:06] brought up

[01:42:06] those

[01:42:06] kind of

[01:42:07] books,

[01:42:07] the

[01:42:08] spice

[01:42:08] thrillers

[01:42:08] and the

[01:42:12] edge of

[01:42:13] the seat

[01:42:13] kind of

[01:42:14] action

[01:42:14] stuff.

[01:42:17] Ultimately,

[01:42:20] there's only

[01:42:21] one part

[01:42:21] that's

[01:42:22] how you

[01:42:22] use a

[01:42:24] lot more

[01:42:24] comes into

[01:42:24] play.

[01:42:25] Different

[01:42:26] people come

[01:42:26] with different

[01:42:27] variations and

[01:42:28] different thought

[01:42:29] processes.

[01:42:30] Some people

[01:42:31] compile it

[01:42:31] into

[01:42:32] podcasts,

[01:42:33] some into

[01:42:33] books.

[01:42:34] Right.

[01:42:36] I think if

[01:42:37] you ask me,

[01:42:38] I think

[01:42:38] there's

[01:42:38] something called

[01:42:39] By the

[01:42:39] Way of

[01:42:40] Deception.

[01:42:41] It's an

[01:42:42] Israeli

[01:42:42] one.

[01:42:42] Brilliant.

[01:42:43] Beautiful

[01:42:44] books.

[01:42:44] Look at

[01:42:45] it.

[01:42:47] All right.

[01:42:49] With that,

[01:42:49] we come to

[01:42:50] the end of

[01:42:50] the podcast.

[01:42:53] At many

[01:42:54] points,

[01:42:54] I was so

[01:42:54] inspired that

[01:42:56] I figured

[01:42:57] maybe someday

[01:42:58] I will do

[01:42:59] something of

[01:42:59] this sort.

[01:43:00] At least

[01:43:01] getting into

[01:43:01] manufacturing.

[01:43:02] Because at

[01:43:03] least the

[01:43:03] world I

[01:43:04] come from

[01:43:04] is quite

[01:43:05] different

[01:43:05] software,

[01:43:06] as I

[01:43:06] mentioned.

[01:43:09] I feel

[01:43:09] like there

[01:43:10] are many

[01:43:10] different

[01:43:10] ways you

[01:43:11] can make

[01:43:11] money.

[01:43:11] But the

[01:43:12] thing is

[01:43:13] that when

[01:43:13] I speak

[01:43:13] to you

[01:43:14] guys,

[01:43:14] passion for

[01:43:15] product comes

[01:43:15] out,

[01:43:16] there's also

[01:43:17] this element

[01:43:18] of national

[01:43:18] trade,

[01:43:19] clearly.

[01:43:20] And despite

[01:43:21] all of these

[01:43:21] many different

[01:43:22] obstacles,

[01:43:24] very small

[01:43:24] that are in

[01:43:25] your way,

[01:43:26] I'm very

[01:43:27] confident that

[01:43:28] you will

[01:43:29] make it

[01:43:30] all the way

[01:43:30] through.

[01:43:30] I hope

[01:43:31] so.

[01:43:32] I think we

[01:43:33] all hope

[01:43:34] so.

[01:43:34] As long as

[01:43:34] challenges keep

[01:43:35] coming in,

[01:43:35] let's be happy.

[01:43:36] The day that the

[01:43:37] challenges stop,

[01:43:37] it's no longer

[01:43:38] fun to have

[01:43:39] our guys

[01:43:39] sitting around

[01:43:40] and say,

[01:43:41] we need more

[01:43:42] challenges.

[01:43:42] The hardest

[01:43:43] challenges are

[01:43:44] reserved for

[01:43:45] the best of

[01:43:45] us.

[01:43:45] So thank you

[01:43:48] again.

[01:43:48] Thanks so

[01:43:48] much.

[01:43:49] It's been such

[01:43:50] an inspiring

[01:43:51] conversation,

[01:43:51] I should say.

[01:43:52] And thanks for

[01:43:53] hosting us.

[01:43:54] Thank you.