Editorial with Sujit Nair | The Ceasefire & Treaty India Signed With Pakistan | Modi

[00:00:00] Namaskar! Welcome to another episode of Editorial. The Prime Minister of India day before yesterday said that listen you know what this is not a ceasefire. We've just temporarily paused our operation on Pakistan and we will only cease to end all of this once we finish off terror from Pakistan.

[00:00:29] Ok, a lot of experts have also said this that you know it's a temporary pause which is somehow different to ceasefire. Yeah I mean let's talk about this. This is a very interesting topic. Let's get right to the show.

[00:00:47] You see Temporary pause technically means what? Temporary pause means we stop for some time. Now the point is when you say temporary pause, it doesn't define the time. temporary pause doesn't say normally it is 1 to 2 months temporary pause doesn't say normally it is 1 to 2 years temporary pause doesn't say

[00:01:16] normally it is 10 to 20 years temporary pause doesn't say all that temporary pause means we have paused it for some time, for some period theek eh na? I will tell you why am I telling all this you see the relationship between India and Pakistan the war between India and Pakistan the skirmishes between India and Pakistan was always a temporary pause this is what I want to prove today there was never a permanent

[00:01:45] ceasefire between Pakistan and India ever we must have signed treaties, we must have signed where they said that there is temporary ceasefire but there was never a temporary ceasefire between India and Pakistan why do you ask? the reason being 1947 it started when Pakistan had sent insurgents to Kashmir, there was a war in 1965 there was a war in 1971 there was a war in 1999 there was skirmishes in 2001-2002

[00:02:14] there was skirmishes in 2003 tell me what ceasefire are we talking about? each of these time we signed a ceasefire but was that a ceasefire? that was not because it was a temporary pause some pause for 5 years some pause for 10 years some pause it was a temporary pause so there is nothing new we are talking there is nothing new we are talking and I have heard a lot of commentators also commenting the fact that listen you know

[00:02:43] something is going to happen this is just a temporary pause it has always been temporary pause with India and Pakistan where did we reach a permanent solution? where did we reach a permanent ceasefire? where did we reach a permanent understanding? we never reached a permanent understanding we never reached then we never reach now this is the first point I want to make think about it think about it logically without you know complications and you know using words like geopolitics and that politics

[00:03:13] and all these words I hear a lot of people using and you know kind of complicating things baat toh simple hai ok so that's point number 1 point number 2 what is the difference? the difference is in 1947 we had a ceasefire and that ceasefire established the line of control we ensured that we made Pakistan say

[00:03:43] this is the line of control you will not cross this that ceasefire that war that skirmish bought about something 1947 1948 it had a result 1965 had a result because there was a Tashkent agreement ceasefire there was a Tashkent declaration that we signed with Pakistan Pakistan was forced to sign a Tashkent declaration because our troops walked right up to Lahore

[00:04:14] and this one is fact news not fake news our troops went right up to Lahore I will tell you what Tashkent agreement said Tashkent agreement said one ceasefire and troops withdrawal both the nations agreed to withdraw their armed force pre-war position that is pre-August 5th 1965 position they said we will withdraw and we will make everything normal number 1 this is what India wanted and this is what India got remember my last editorial I said

[00:04:43] that if we are calling for a ceasefire if we are saying that we are going to get them on a negotiating table then it should be at India's terms India should get what India wants because not again like I said not because we are arrogant not because we think we are some great super power no no no it is not even jingoism it is because they are the perpetrators we are the people who are suffering now look at Tashkant agreement

[00:05:13] look at Tashkant declaration very clearly restoration of relationship they said everything will go back to normal non-interference please read this non-interference both countries pledged not to interfere in each other's internal affair and discourage propaganda that could harm bilateral relationships very important isn't this what India want this is what India got after 1965 this is what India forced

[00:05:43] Pakistan to sign after 1965 that's a treaty and that's ceasefire okay prisoner exchange we an orderly repartition of prisoners of war and and civilian abductees and was was mandated peaceful dispute of resolution and return of territories so almost everything that India wanted is what we got them to sign during Tashkent declaration so there was a war in 1965 and there was a Tashkent declaration which was the outcome

[00:06:13] of the war after the ceasefire okay very clear let's keep this aside now let us talk about the third war which was 1971 1971 now coming back let me draw your attention back we had a war in 1965 and in 1971 we had another war now what would you call this the first war would you call that a temporary pause or would you call it a complete

[00:06:43] ceasefire because a complete ceasefire would mean that we have reached agreement we have reached an arrangement and nothing more will or nothing less everything is settled but no after six years we had another war and that was the 1971 this is what I said that we every time with Pakistan we only had temporary pauses sometimes for a slightly longer duration sometimes for a shorter duration but end of the day it was temporary pauses 1971 1971

[00:07:12] one doesn't need to say much because 1971 we divided Pakistan into two we created East Pakistan we gave East Pakistan an independent status and the formal international mediation that took place brought about the Simla agreement the Simla agreement was very clear Simla agreement like I told you last time was very clear and India said next time we have a problem this will be sorted out bilaterally there will be no international party

[00:07:42] USA Soviet Russia nobody is going to come we are going to solve our problems bilaterally this was what the Simla agreement was and of course it reestablished the line of control so end of the day war 3 also ensured the first one may not call as a war so war 2 technically that is 1965 and 1971 1971 also

[00:08:11] technically established that established the LOC and the fact that we will have a bilateral discussion whenever we need to have one so there was something that what India put up and there was something that India got in return that's what I meant by having a ceasefire on our terms this is what I was talking about okay now let's go to Kargil war 1999 1999 Kargil war the US president Bill Clinton like Trump

[00:08:41] was absolutely getting himself involved in the conflict he was talking to Pakistan he spoke to India and Pakistan was actually begging Bill Clinton to kind of mediate and sort this issue out but you know what at that point in time this is what the Prime Minister of India had to say that just have a look I in that are good Yeah

[00:09:11] I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm I'm

[00:09:40] I am not going to talk about the war until I am not gone to America. I tell me, I was very clear. Why did we do this war? Because we don't want your insurgency. You are creating trouble in our land. We are okay. We will stop the war. We will give you a ceasefire. We have no problem.

[00:10:10] Give us our land back which you took during your Kargil misadventure and you ensure that you do not do it again. We will call it ceasefire. You going to United States talking to Bill Clinton and asking, Bill Clinton calling me and saying, Hey Baba, the Prime Minister of Pakistan is here. Are you coming? He said, no pressure. All those pressures will not work with me. All those pressures will not work with me. And you know what we got out of Kargil?

[00:10:40] I will tell you what we got out of Kargil. Pakistan announced the withdrawal of its forces and de facto ceasefire was achieved in July 1999. We called it the Vijay Divas. As Indian forces retook remaining possessions. There was no formal ceasefire agreement was signed. But the withdrawal marked the end of the hostilities. India wanted them to withdraw. They withdrew. Kattam. Key result area. What we wanted to achieve, we achieved. They came into our land.

[00:11:09] We threw them out of our land. We didn't go to meet any America and any United Nations and any nothing. We did bilaterally. We did what we wanted. We got what we wanted. And there was no ceasefire and all signed. When they went back, that was the end of story. Then they never came again. They never had the guts to come again and recapture that land. 1999. 1999. So, 1965, 1971, 1999.

[00:11:38] Would you call 1965 ceasefire? Would you call 1971 ceasefire? You had 1999. Would you call that ceasefire? No. You know why? Because 2001-2002, Pakistan standoff. There was almost a standoff with Pakistan. And that was when we had the terror attack on Indian parliament. December 13, 2001. December 13, 2001, we launched something called as Operation Parakram. Deploying over 5 lakh troops in the border.

[00:12:08] And again, a lot of international bodies intervened for Pakistan asking us to show restraint. And the United States, supported by UK and other countries, pressurized both nations to deescalate due to global concerns of 9-11 and nuclear risk. Pakistan President Parves Musharraf banned militant groups and promised to curb cross-border terrorism in January 2000 speech.

[00:12:36] He did exactly what India wanted him to do. Ban cross-border terrorism. Ban militant groups. India also. After that. After he spoke. In October. He spoke in January. We, in October, started formally reducing, deescalating, calling our troops back. So, Operation Parakram, we sent our troops. The President of Pakistan said that, Baba, we will ban militant groups.

[00:13:04] We will curb this militant action within Pakistan borders. All these insurgencies, we will curb. He said that. Then, we called our troops back. There was an operation and there was a clear result. There was a lot of international groups saying that to nuclear, like UK, US and all. They all put pressure. But India stood its ground. India stood its ground. 2003 again. 2003 again. 2003 again. The LOC started.

[00:13:34] The LOC was volatile. And frequent artillery were exchanged. 2003. This, just after 2002, when Parvez Musharraf called and said that we are going to stop curb militancy and all that. 2003 again. LOC became volatile. Again, there was a ceasefire process. Again, in September 2003, during the UN General Assembly, Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf proposed a ceasefire along the line of control to reduce hostilities.

[00:14:01] India under the Prime Ministership of Atal B.R. Iwajpayee accepted the proposal under the Border Peace Initiative. The formal ceasefire agreement was announced on November 26, 2003 effective immediately. The both sides agreed to halt fire and small arm exchanges facilitated direct communication between the military officers. They said, listen, okay, we will stop all this. Military will be in touch. We will not fire at each other. Who went to UN? Parvez Musharraf went to UN. Who went pleading to UN?

[00:14:30] Very clearly, Parvez Musharraf went pleading to UN. So, the point is, 2002, 2003, 2001, 1999, 1971, 1965. All these were wars, act of wars or wars or skirmishes where bullets were fired. So, where is this concept of ceasefire? All of this, if you consider, look at the line.

[00:14:59] Look at this line from 1947 to 2025. At every interval, there was skirmishes. There was exchange of fires. There was shelling. So, where is the concept? What is the concept of ceasefire? What does ceasefire actually mean? Ceasefire, I think, in our context, that is India-Pakistan context, means temporary pause. That is what it means. Now, also, let me tell you, what that also means is,

[00:15:30] Pakistan will sign 100 agreements with us, 100 treaties with us, but they will do exactly what they have to do and they are supposed to do. They are supposed to do for their survival. And what they are supposed to do for their survival is create insurgency in India. What they are supposed to do for their survival is harbour terrorism because that's what, that's part of their production, that's part of their economy, that's part of their, the way they live. I am not talking about an ordinary Pakistani.

[00:15:57] I have nothing to talk about an ordinary Pakistani. I am talking about the Pakistan government which in 12 means Pakistan military because there is nothing called as Pakistan government. We only have Pakistan military and Pakistan military's job is to create terrorism, is to create unrest, is to create insurgency and India is the country that they target and that's exactly what they do. And while their governments will come and sign or at times there even generals have come and sign treaties,

[00:16:26] but end of the day, the next general comes and he starts again. So it's like that. It is like that mischievous student in the class. He is, he is made, he is given punishment, he stands on the bench for one hour, sits 5-10 minutes quiet, 15 minutes, he tries to trouble the class. This is exactly what happens with Pakistan and that is unfortunate. So this is one point I wanted to make. Second point, we spoke about the government a lot.

[00:16:52] We spoke about why, how the government, you know, could allow Trump to take all the credit and you know, Trump is the one who is seeming now actually very, very vocally seeming to take all the credit and very vocally trying to say that it is all us that happened. So it is very unfortunate that that has happened. But let me also talk to you about the opposition. You know, let me, let me give you some very interesting anecdotes.

[00:17:21] I am, I was reading this book. You know, it's a book called Vajpayee, very, very well written book, very well composed book. I was going through the way Vajpayee objected, Vajpayee as an opposition leader, one of the, one of the opposition leaders, the way he conducted the parliament. You know, when, during the Indo-China war, the Indo-China war, Vajpayee says that he called Nehru

[00:17:51] and he told him in the speech, when he was speaking in the parliament, he said, you are the combination of Chamberlain and Churchill. Chamberlain who wanted peace, who called for ceasefire and Churchill who wanted war, who called for attack. So you, he said, you are a combination of that. We don't know which, what side of yours will emerge when. Because, like we all know, Atal B. Arivajpayee was not very for calling ceasefire with China.

[00:18:20] He wanted us to push out China, out of India. There is another very interesting anecdote in this book. Where, you know, in, during India, India-Pakistan war of 1965, Chinese made a allegation that, you know, our Indian soldiers, we kidnapped 800 sheeps from the Tibetan border. 800 sheeps.

[00:18:46] You know, Atal B. Arivajpayee, he took a rally with 200 sheeps. I will read what was, what is written in the book because it is written very beautifully. Vajpayee led one of the strangest and the rarest procession the capital has ever seen. He took around 800 sheeps, trotted this afternoon to the Chinese embassy on the Litten Road with placard round their necks saying that, Hum ko khhao duniya ko bachao.

[00:19:15] Thousands of laughing citizens of Delhi lined up in the route of the procession. Expectedly, the embassy officials refused to accept the sheep Vajpayee offered as a mock compensation. In true Jansang tradition, copies of the memorandum were pasted in the embassy walls. Two days later, China shot of a very angry letter to the Indian embassy in Peking, complaining about Vajpayee's protest.

[00:19:44] The government clarified that it was only a spontaneous, peaceful and good-humoured expression against Chinese bullying and trumped up and trivial issue. This, the reason I wanted to narrate this incident and I wanted to talk about this particular book

[00:20:05] is because this is how opposition actually dealt when the country was either not during war but on ceasefire, on policies that the countries were taking, on decisions the countries were taking. I am kind of appalled as to why one doesn't see anything from Indian opposition.

[00:20:32] The only thing you see in the Indian opposition, in fact I don't even want to call Shashi Tharoor an opposition. The only opposition person you see is Shashi Tharoor and I don't know whether he is opposition or he is part of Bharatiya Janata Party. In fact, he is brilliant when it comes to Bharatiya Janata Party. Bharatiya Janata Party should be hiring him. Hiring him to defend their stance. He does it well.

[00:20:57] So, the fact is, there is no, and ironically, you know Shashi Tharoor has endorsed this book. I only wish he had read this. He had read this once before endorsing it but Shashi Tharoor is not important. What is the point that I am trying to make is, unfortunately, the only opposition we have are people like Shashi Tharoor

[00:21:21] and the others who call themselves opposition like Rahul Gandhi and others, I hardly see them. I hardly see their views. In fact, I get to see more of Shekhar Gupta's and Akash Banerji's and Barkhadad's views than the opposition's views. You get to see more journalists speak about it, talk about it, explain things than opposition's view.

[00:21:48] Where is the opposition? Why are they hiding? Why are they under the cot? And when are they going to come out of the cot and start talking about what is happening around them? This is India for crying out loud. We have to, we are a democracy. So it's a very unfortunate situation as far as the opposition is concerned. This is the two bits I wanted to tell you. So to conclude, there are four points I wanted to make.

[00:22:17] Point number one is this concept of temporary pause. If you look at it from a, from a historic perspective, if you keep the entire events that happened since 1947 to now, it has always been a temporary pause between India and Pakistan. It has always been a temporary pause. Number two. Every time, every time there was a skirmish stroke war,

[00:22:48] because all the dates that I mentioned were not wars. In fact, 1971, 1965 would be considered as war. Or 1999 would be considered as war. Others were skirmishes, escalations. And all these had a definitive result. And that result was in our favour. Ha! It is a different issue that Pakistan never kept their word, which I told you before also. And I continue to say this. They will never keep their word.

[00:23:15] Assuming there is a result for this war too. They don't keep their words. That I understand. But at least they came down to the negotiating table like I told you. And there was a discussion agreement on our terms. Point number two. Point number three I wanted to make.

[00:23:36] Is that this is possibly the first time we are not aware of what the key result area are. Key result area. What did we do? Why did we do? And what we got out of it? That is not seen clearly during this particular war. At least till now. Tomorrow it could happen. I don't know. At least till now.

[00:24:01] Till now, whether there will be another war, there will be another skirmish, it is Alpaviram, it is temporary pause. All that is what is being said. I don't know what is that we got out of the entire picture at least till now. That is point number three. Point number four is the role of the opposition. While we have been speaking about the government, I also want to speak about the opposition. What is the opposition doing? What role is the opposition playing? Where are leaders who actually talk? Where are they?

[00:24:32] We need more than good English to listen to. We need logic and sense. Where are opposition leaders? Why are they not coming out? Why are they not talking? These are the four points I wanted to raise through this editorial. And till I see you next time. That's tomorrow at 10. Namaskar.